A right to choose to create a new State is not the same as an actual power to create one.
Rowan Nicholson
Introduction, and the general thesis of the article
In this article I focus on self-determination and secession as it plays out in the current South African political environment, and we then place that debate in its global perspective. I conclude that the current dismissive and simplified local narratives around much of the debate are in themselves conflict causes, and that this serves to perpetuate the negative aspects of an increasingly necessary debate. The current approach to the debate causes additional polarization and has been allowed, by design or by ignorance, to become a cyclical conflict cause that should be addressed in a far more skilful and focused manner. This article is also designed to hopefully improve the actual level of relevant knowledge around the general debate beyond the very superficial and identity conflict driven levels that it finds itself stuck in at present.
Given the toxic and divisive nature of much of the current debate in South Africa, I feel the need to clarify my own position on self-determination and secession before we do a comparative study on these two topics, and then apply them to the South African position. Personally, and insofar as this may be relevant, I see questions of legality, constitutionality, commercial viability and a range of other very practical problems standing in the way of any meaningful secession happening in the South African environment, and the unskilful manner in which the ideas are debated are causes of cyclical conflict on important aspects, which causes are harmful in themselves but which also lead to a range of secondary conflicts, mostly caused by our other, unresolved, national conflicts.
This causes further secondary negative conflict outcomes such as increased polarization, cynicism of people and processes, and conflict rigidity, all of which make any meaningful progress increasingly more difficult. Bluntly put, I do not believe that self-determination or secession in South Africa, for any group, is a feasible proposition, but that we should allow the debate, once and for all, to be aired and explored in a much more measured and skilful manner. We will return to those aspects below.
A few working definitions and tools
In the interest of clarity of communication, I have in mind the following working definitions when I make use of the concepts discussed.
1. Self-determination
Rowan Nicholson has a helpful six-part categorization of the types of self-determination, a distinction that in itself describes the rich variety of meanings and limitations that this important concept has in practice. He sets out these categories of self-determination as a (i) moral or political idea, (ii) external self-determination, (iii) internal self-determination, (iv)as indigenous autonomy, (v) a right against intervention, and (vi) economic self-determination.
This distinction, and others like it, is of practical value, as observation tells us that the 1960 declaration by the United Nations General Assembly that “all peoples have the right to self-determination” of course does not translate to just that in practice, and the declaration is so vague, unintended or otherwise, as to be of little practical guidance. These categories should not be considered as watertight concepts, and the experience of the last number of decades show that these lines are often blurred and dynamic, even in the same disputed area across short periods of time.
When self-determination is discussed or claimed, it is therefore important to be clear on exactly what category is intended. This vagueness can render the term practically problematical and useless in furthering debates, as Martti Koskenniemi has said about the historical examples of Yugoslavia. This does not mean that the term is without legal importance or that clarity should not be pursued, but it highlights the problems lying in waiting right at the door of such debates. Social media provides ample examples of people arguing past each other, simply because of these unintended definition differences.
Practical methods of determining this right, in practice, would include whether the people seeking such self-determination has been colonized or not, the shared history with the other group(s) and so on, all being of some assistance but not determinative in its own regard. I believe that the political science need for certainty in this principle can be exchanged for a conflict management approach of having a sense of ambiguity in determining those boundaries, all as part of the power-play that needs resolution in any event.
I love Uriel Abulof’s lyrical reference to self-determination being “a political response to the disenchantment of the world”, The term is therefore a necessary one, one where we can all see the vague outlines of what is claimed, which can then be filled in and clarified as any related process takes shape. In South Africa the concept has differences in nuance according to who is using it in any event.
2. Secession
It should then come as no surprise that with this concept we again have significant dissension on its exact definition, with scholarly debate often getting rather heated. Here again, the lack of consensus has real world implications. There are narrow and wider definitions, various theories competing, and again, I would suggest, this developed and to-be-expected uncertainty simply underscores the importance of the issues at hand, and should not be viewed as a liability in the managing or resolution of such conflicts.
Several guidelines have crystalized in practice here as well, and so we see, for example, that in state creation by secession the recognition of the seceding territory by other states have an important role to play in achieving such statehood, as even conceded by many secessionists. Many of the more narrow definitions of secession are rooted in the original scepticism and even hostility towards secession, exhibited by nations (as well as the United Nations) during the 20th century) seeking to defend their territorial integrity and its real or perceived certainty and security.
As with self-determination, an exact and hopefully shared understanding of secession can bring progress and resolution to a disputed state, and prevent confusion with concepts and goals such as may fall more correctly under colonialism or irredentism (the withdrawal of a territory from one state and its incorporation into another state). In my view, a broader definition of secession (used by Anderson, Radan and others) would be the most practical in actual diplomacy and conflict management. History shows us also that this distinction is resolved where the original and seceding territories agree on such secession (Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Eritrea etc), while an absence of such agreement will increase the precision necessary as far as a working definition of secession is concerned.
3. The main treaties applicable In any extended debate or conflict about secession, I would suggest that the following three treaties should play a role in guiding or persuading the parties involved, that being the United States Charter, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. If it is understood that secession also benefits from the views of others, and that recognition is an asset in these conflicts, the general influence of the UN, even in modern times, remains of importance.
The role of minorities in these conflicts
In assessing this important question we again come up against our earlier discussion about people’s rights to secession and the vagaries of imprecise definitions. International law and lived conflicts here show us a helpful distinction between indigenous people and others. With those nuances and distinctions in place we are starting to approach a slightly more helpful understanding of these “peoples” when we are dealing with minorities claiming secession.
Prominent Italian jurist Francesco Capotorti’s definition of minorities has stood the test of time and argument since 1979, stating that minorities can be seen as:
A group numerically inferior to the rest of the population of a State, in a non-dominant position, whose members -being nationals of the State- possess ethnic, religious or linguistic characteristics differing from the rest of the population and show, if only implicitly, a sense of solidarity, directed towards preserving their culture, traditions, religion or language.
We will return later in this article to this definition. The concept is further refined by jurisprudence and practical examples of the gross violations of human rights and / or the concept of remedial self-determination and, while the applicability of this may possibly be argued in the South African context, we need not spend much time on those categories. I do not believe that they will assist secessionists in a South African debate, at least in the form that we find them in past global conflicts. Minorities themselves have, in most instances, less of a right to claim the nebulous right of people to self-determination than groups that are not minorities, with Ukraine, Kosovo, the Aaland Islands and other case studies providing illustrative examples of exceptions and possible solutions.
The importance of the territory claimed or disputed
Modern self-determination debates and conflicts are strongly defined by actual territory. This shows an important shift from earlier models. Academic models globally have taken to these developments, to the extent of thinking of self-determination as a right of territories, from which human communities benefit or not. This distinction is not always clearly made in recent South African debates, which may have little or no effect in the court of public opinion, but which will have its negative effect in any more formal disputes.
Territory is a vital organizing principle, both as far as the external aspects of the debate are concerned, but also the crucial, but often neglected issue of internal self-determination. The concept of minority rights, if that forms part of a given claim to self-determination, works best when debated and negotiated as a territorial claim. It focuses questions of territorial integrity and sovereignty, and may serve to persuade external support. This focus also brings into play the UN General Assembly’s Friendly Relations Declaration (UN GA Res. 2625 1970), which should assist the debate in South Africa, as it (the so-called “saving clause”) brings clarity to the territorial aspects, and gives further guidance on complete representation, the territory involved and the requirement that such representation should be “without distinction as to race, creed or colour”.
The case for secession
Is there a plausible case for secession to be made in South Africa? The observer is badly served by most of the online and social media arguments, and longer form debates or presentations also seem generally to present inconclusive, incomplete or unpersuasive arguments. What would a more successful argument have to include? One foundational argument that the proponents of secession have not made convincingly or at all, is the apparent emotional objection right at the start of the debate.
Secession as presented and as understood seems a foreign, new, invasive idea. Why divide the existing country? This visceral idea colours much of the subsequent propositions. Time could be spent on emphasizing the simple fact that the majority of existing states are in fact the products of secession. The 20th century saw the expansion of sovereign states, through various factors such as decolonization, to the extent that some 70% of existing sovereign entities are the result of secession of some sort or another.
Research and case studies show ethnicity and / or national identity have been shown to be a “key determinant” in understanding and presenting the dynamics of secession debates. And yet, the proponents of secession show no real understanding of the content or importance of modern identity conflict strategies. The arguments, detailed and often objectively accurate as they are, make the case for the in-group and either leaves the relevant out-group unmoved, or given the dynamics of these conflicts, even more entrenched in their previous views of opposition to secession. In getting this foundational strategy wrong, the proponent group is doomed to failure even with the best presented and objectively comprehensive political or economic argument.
Focus seems to be on the suffering, inconvenience or risks of the group seeking secession, while little to no effective work being done on the receiving groups, their views, emotions and involved interests. This often leaves the one group impressed with the objective merits of their argument, and the receiving group appalled at the offensive nature of the very suggestion of secession.
Similarly, no apparent or successfully communicated distinction is drawn between the proximate and the underlying causes of the need for secession, which is fatal to any legal argument as well as, probably more important, the identity conflict and persuasive aspects of such campaigns. In addition to being poor conflict management strategy, the arguments we see are also suffering from a naïve defect. Secession, especially in our context, entails loss of territory and a range of adverse economic outcomes for the existing national state.
Successful secessions manage to build up, over time, sufficient pressure to make meaningful and high-level negotiations plausible and desirable for all concerned, a low-level version of Zartman’s conflict ripeness concept. This pressure is simply never achieved by any of the current proponents, largely because of the persistent failing in building a compelling case for secession firstly, and then getting the identity conflict persuasive process so badly wrong that it is very easy for the national state to dismiss the proposition without any political cost. If the identity conflict argument fails to gain traction right at the outset, it becomes easy to ignore the rest of the debate, which may have more to offer by way of substantive arguments.
While there seems to be a reasonably focused media campaign(s) behind the present South African secession debates, there is a marked lack of clarity on the required normative arguments that case studies show will be necessary to lead to further successes with these projects. The moral underpinnings of the arguments are vaguely drawn, at best, and here too case studies show how such lack of clarity defuses other arguments. For example, the well-established just-cause theory requires that a people’s right to secede convincingly show some form of major injustice against the group by the host state.
What does the best form of the Cape secession arguments look like in this category? Even using other categories of arguments (eg choice, democratic right, Baubock’s multi-level theory), the normative arguments are either not used or their content proves to be unpersuasive when compared to successful past examples of secession. As such, the South African secession argument seems to be stuck in the first of the four recognized phases of successful secession processes, that of emergence, with the further three phases of consolidation, escalation and recognition not being reached.
The causes of secession debates
Conflict and political science case studies (with the work of Diego Muro being of particular assistance) show that most modern secession debates, although defined as political or economic debates, are really better understood as being debates and claims around the common element of one or more grievance. Once we approach these debates through that conflict lens, and not as primarily legal or economic arguments, they become easier to assess and guide.
This is a crucial understanding, as it determines the correct application of the primary conflict causes, which in turn have a direct and determinative influence on the available options and solutions, or lack thereof. The South African secession debates use as their justification a wide range of reasons, depending on who you ask. These range from poor or unreliable service delivery concerns, safety and security, economic underperformance, favouritism, corruption, employment equity disputes, unemployment concerns and so on. The manner in which these debates are run in the South African social and other media turns these reasons into ongoing causes for polarization and cyclical conflict causes, never really effectively addressed. They are also interlinked with other national political conflicts, making them far from isolated or niche projects.
The perception of unity
In properly assessing modern secession conflicts, we should note that they are often muddied by an unspoken acceptance of unity and representivity in the claimant group. Case studies show, for instance with the SPLM in Southern Sudan, the Turkish Worker’s Party and the LTTE in Sri Lanka, that such unity and its resultant conflict considerations, are often misplaced. The range of different parties and organizations in the South African debates would seem to bear this out. Such fragmentation, where it exists, devalues some of the pro-secession arguments, and become conflict dynamics in dealing with the conflicts themselves, including the importance of the conflict itself, the content and urgency thereof, and the involved parties’ options at any future negotiation table.
In the Cape secession debates, we have various parties and organizations participating in the debates, with none of them having any significant political heft, but that does not mean that they do not remain a meaningful conflict cause, as we shall see further on.
Would a referendum be effective?
Arnold Toynbee was an enthusiastic advocate for referendums settling matters of secession, and in the post-World War 1 period these strategies were rather successful, given their conflict circumstances. Their use has become rarer in recent decades. Recent comparative secession conflicts can be of some assistance in deciding their place of our own debates. The experience of Catalonia in 2017 shows that even the very referendum event itself can cause conflict, when this community in Spain voted at 92% to become independent of Spain, only for the process itself to be determined as illegal and unconstitutional by Spanish authorities. In earlier decades in the 20th century Iceland and Norway had similar experiences, also without resolution at the time.
Additional modern examples would include the breakup of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia. Globally, since 1860, we have had more than 60 referendums for independence. The successful ones really show an environment where the states involved were in transition. Can that be said about a settled, democratic South Africa?
Other than that, referendums seem pointless when we consider international comparative experience. The best argument that can be made in support of such an exercise, is that a victory for secessionists in a referendum presents a symbolic victory, an exercise that may mobilize the in-group in future, and serve as persuasive argument in garnering external support and pressure. It may also, as is the case with Catalonia, support the establishment and maintenance of an autonomous group within the national state, if that should become the goal. Given our earlier observations, it is unlikely that even this limited mechanism for determination will happen by consent with the national state.
Challenges with legal arguments and legislation involving referendums in the Cape secession debate may benefit by assessing what real value such referendums have in any event. Actual case studies also show us the significant practical problems that can arise from this seemingly simple idea (who gets to vote, for example).
Unrecognized statehood?
Interesting work in conflict studies and political science is being done on the modern arguments for the de facto existence of unrecognized statehood. Interesting conflict solutions appear for parties that qualify, with disputed recognition and its consequences presenting itself as helpful examples such as Palestine, Kosovo, Taiwan, Chechnya and so on. The Cape secession arguments simply do not comply with global consensus arguments around this category (see for instance Pal Kolsto’s three requirements). Here the Democratic Alliance’s idea of devolution as opposed to secession could be considered by proponents.
Government response as conflict resolution strategy
The responses and strategies available to existing states in countering secession arguments are receiving sustained and interesting global attention. With the shifting powerbases and the birth of the multipolar world, this is understandable, and soon to be justified, in my view. Several strategies have crystalized that are available for incumbent states, and two that I believe deserve closer consideration in the South African context would be controlled public debate, and / or a formal challenge to the legality of secession. There is already a strong legal argument informally made against such secession, which may or may not benefit from further exposure and development.
International law
As complex as the debate may have become when we consider certain specific areas in recent global secession conflicts, the current international legal position does not aid the Cape secession debates at all. The important nexus between self-determination and secession has become, in practice, a rather unhelpful lens, often obfuscating more than clarifying. International law maintains, quite understandably, a strong presumption in favour of the maintenance of national territorial integrity. The observed mechanisms used in practice to enforce secession (subordination of an ethnic minority, predation, an inalterable adverse national political community etc) all provide well-established high bars which any case made for the secession of the Cape or any territory in South Africa will have to contend with.
Why then give any attention to the secession debate?
The secession debate in South Africa seems to be managed by being ignored. This is a tempting solution, one with much precedent globally. There is also the not-unjustified concern that focused rebuttals or any formal governmental opposition may increase polarization and tend to strengthen those seeking secession. This modern “if we do not build it, they will not come” version of the strategy has its value, but is it the best conflict strategy under the circumstances? I believe that secession conflicts will become more popular, more focused and more globally acceptable in the next decade.
The conflict consequences of a multipolar world, increased viability and popularity of nationalist and populist arguments, an intensification of polarization across a spectrum of important issues, a collapse of shared values and institutions and other conflict drivers will serve to increase the attractiveness of secession as a conflict option. Add to the South African context the 2025 conflict dynamics caused by the Trump administrations’ various pronouncements on important aspects used in traditional secession arguments, and it becomes irresponsible to simply reject or ignore these conflict causes. Is it that inconceivable that the secession debate in South Africa will widen and become more complex, including other groups and claims?
In addition to claims of Cape independence (a few groups) and Afrikaner volkstaat claims (also various groups), we find claims of historical grievances from Zulu groups (if not secession claims). Recent polls in the Cape show 67% coloured support, 23% white support and 10% black support. Are those really figures best addressed by being ignored as a conflict strategy?
On November 1, 2025 the NCC leader, Fadiel Adams, claimed the Cape as ancestral coloured / Khoisan territory, claiming protection from various complaints stemming from being part of the larger Republic of South Africa. In doing so, Adams uses the other Cape secessionist arguments, but adds a more ethnic lens to the arguments. Again, we see the modern pattern where these essentially secessionist claims are used as platforms or drivers of other, more national disputes and unresolved conflicts. Ignoring these intertwined conflict causes has, in part, caused them to surface in this manner, and ignoring them further will keep these conflict causes alive.
While I would not use the existence of Orania as an example of a secession debate, ongoing public debate certainly centres the area as a visible example of what self-determination and eventual secession look like. These arguments are used as political platforms and focal points in larger political campaigns, serving the interests of political division and creating and sustaining in-group narratives. It fits well with larger debates on migration and purity tests for who the real South Africans really are, and what happens to those who are not.
In assessing the secession debates, even in their best form, as legal and conceptual non-starters we lose sight of the strategic value these arguments have as conflict causes, as drivers of identity conflicts and useful narratives to create political activation. It is naïve to believe that these debates will simply go away because we believe them to be absurd or legally untenable.
A proposed conflict management strategy
A brave, if debatable strategy, is for the national state to simply create a suitable, limited (in time and size) forum where the debate(s) can be aired and disposed of, one way or the other, a secession dialogue, if you will. The debate is out there in the public domain already, so any focused attention will hardly now ignite further countrywide support. If conducted skilfully, it can however show any inconsistencies and impracticalities that may be hidden from view in this current approach.
Such a strategy could include a few televised debates, an active government campaign of advertising and influencing, and arguably a referendum, subject to the limitations as considered earlier. As much as the government, and presumably a large section of the South African public, may experience the idea of secession as an offensive and even absurd idea, that dismissiveness is of course one of the identity conflict drivers that increases polarization and strengthens the opposing views, what we can call the identity see-saw.
Again, dismissiveness and a studious ignoring of the problem may be justified, but that may not be the best conflict strategy. If such a strategy is deemed too risky or wasteful, one of the four crystalized existing state strategies that we referred to earlier can be considered, with a legislative challenge to secession efforts a strong option. Litigation and legislative options are however very blunt tools in modern society, and they fail to consistently persuade, as we can see from other South African examples such as land claims, migration conflicts and so on. The in-group is simply, and easily, persuaded that such interventions are further evidence of their just cause.
Secession claims will always be with us, as they generally provide an attractive deemed alternative to current realities, a reaching back to a real or imagined past, or the expressed intent to create a own homeland different from the existing state. As such, any efforts at destroying such impulses are as harmful as they are unnecessary.
Our politically popular conflict strategies of ignoring our problems, or compromising on them, are also not necessary or effective tools here. In my view, the secession question is just about big enough to constitute a challenge that should be dealt with, and not ignored.
The best approach for the government, in my view, and summarised for our purposes, will be to design an effective and comprehensive information campaign, really taking the debate to the streets, and building such campaign on the very best modern identity conflict persuasion dynamics, to in that process create an existing an well-maintained body of work, answers and solutions that exists after the campaign, and to conclude such campaign on a respectful but convincing level. Some doubters will remain, of course, but the main purpose of such a campaign would be to show, once and for all, the reasons why secession as currently framed, is not the best option for those claiming it, why it is not feasible or desirable, and providing attractive alternative answers.
This should be engineered not just on objective, data-driven arguments, but also the more emotional levers only found in identity conflicts. The entire process can be designed and concluded in a month or two.
Will this be implemented? I doubt that. Reaction to these debates have been labelled as treasonous, racist and a range of other related responses, simply designed to shut down the arguments. It is of course an understandable and arguable response to simply ignore and denigrate such efforts, but then we need to accept the continuation of these conflict causes, and not be surprised as they continue to do the work they are designed to do. Abraham Lincoln, as one well-known political leader, suffered for years under various threats from Southerners to secede, and these events provide us with one helpful case study in evasion politics when it deals with secession debates.
Internationally, I believe that some aspects of these secession arguments are viewed as colonial relics, to be humoured and ignored, although the Trump administration’s various views on subjects related to secession may ignite and expand these debates, all providing more reason to once and for all effectively determine and resolve these conflicts.
What our study here should also show us, and hopefully this benefits the debate somewhat, is that secession conflicts are not treasonous or malicious conflict events. History shows us a very long list of examples of people of goodwill who wanted to secede not so much out of a specific hate for what they wanted to leave behind, but an enduring love for what they wanted to preserve. As that same history shows us, those wishes were often misplaced and ill-founded on various grounds, but they were still the sincere expressions of concern and a need for some form of freedom that deserve to be taken seriously, to be addressed, and resolved, as the complex conflicts that they are.
Personally, I do not believe that any one of the claims for self-determination or secession currently existing in South Africa will, or could, clear all of the hurdles in its way. We have briefly touched on only a few of these considerations here, and the challenges are enormous. These groups may not have the right to secede, but they have the right to argue their case within the framework of our laws and constitution. It is not that rare a demand.
If these impulses are going to be negated or minimized, it will not happen by ignoring or dismissing them with contempt. Several conflict drivers, such as unemployment, the migration debates and others, are sufficiently linked to these demands so as to increase them if not correctly managed.
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading
1. For the statistically minded reader, and so as to not expand on an already long article, I can refer the reader to recent polls on Cape independence, most notably the ones by Victory Research (March 2025), AtlasIntel (2024) or the 2025 Ipsos poll.
2. As an introductory volume of work, showing a reasonable spectrum of range and depth, I would recommend something like The Routledge Handbook of Self-determination and Secession, with Ryan D. Griffiths, Aleksandar Pavkovic and Peter Radan editors, published by Routledge (2023).
3. Relevant articles for related conflict work, such as identity conflicts, and their source material, can be found at www.conflict-conversations.co.za
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok
November 2025