What have come to be known as “spoilers” in a peace process are an endemic problem. Whether real or potential, leaders of parties or movements, either within or outside a peace process, spoilers are typically thought to constitute themselves as deliberate obstacles to the peaceful settlement of conflicts and employ violence to achieve their objectives.
Ibrahim A. Gambari
Introduction
Much of our everyday professional or personal conflicts centres around the two or three parties primarily involved in any given conflict, and we make our calculations and implement our strategies according to that assessment. This is mirrored in academic conflict work and case studies. Visible actors in a conflict deservedly get our attention. In the political arena, maybe more so than anywhere else, there are however a very important category of participant that we need to include in our assessment and design of effective conflict strategies, and that is the nebulous form of the so-called spoiler.
In this article we will study the concept of spoilers in general, and then apply that information to a particular manifestation of the concept in the environment of the protests and violence involving the South African immigration conflicts of mid-2026.
Spoiler actors examined
Spoilers, as the term has become popularized in conflict studies and practice, are groups or organizations (an individual can be a spoiler in a conflict, but our discussion here is more constructively focused on groups) that have their own agendas to derail, delay or change conflict outcomes in existing conflicts. Spoilers are often dragged into such conflicts due to regional proximity, or an intended conflict outcome threatening their own interests, local or otherwise.
Resolution trajectories in the main conflict may raise concerns in their own in-groups, and spoilers are often either marginalized or ignored minority groups, or parts of larger in-groups that are somehow not aligned with the wider group narratives and goals. They also thrive in environments where security and government presence is weak or ineffective. Spoilers have become extremely effective at their business, and the best examples show how chaos, a lack of structure and administrative or legal frameworks, nebulous command structures and lawlessness can all be crafted into a very effective spoiler unit.
Modern conflict studies and practice, in particular mediation and diplomatic negotiation, have learned these hard lessons in recent decades, and it is a rare conflict practitioner that will not include spoilers as a part of the original assessment and strategic design. Spoilers often have very fragmented and shifting agendas and goals (often a function of ragtag leadership or shrewd manipulation of delaying tactics), and these goals can range from pure derailment (permanent or temporary) of resolution, the delay thereof for various reasons, or even a form of attention-seeking to ensure inclusion and a respectful place at the larger negotiation table.
Spoiler agendas can also be more ambitious, such as secession or independence of some form or another, or as we can see in parts of Africa and South America, the simple establishment and maintenance of a criminal cartel network, with the obvious benefits of such a structure. Well-known examples of spoilers in regional conflicts would be Eritrea in the Ethiopia / Eritrea conflict of the late 90s, various parties in the Somalian conflict, conflicts in Sierra Leone, DRC, Mali, with further examples involved with the conflict roles of the LRA and Boko Haram.
Global position and new developments
In learning how to manage spoilers in larger conflicts the hard way, conflict studies have realized that the previous static way of casting and then attempting to manage that group or groups is a part of the error. Just like the conflict itself changes, often radically, so to do the opportunities, worldviews and other dynamics of the spoiler interests.
The Colombian conflict, that lasted decades, for example, show clear development in existing spoiler groups, and the creation of new spoiler groups from previously more stable groups. Spoilers have now become such a recognized dynamic in conflict studies and strategic design that they have earned their own technical label, that of Armed Non-Statutory Actors (ANSAs).
In an important article published late 2025, the conflict authors Schiff, Michael and Wertman show convincingly how Hamas started as a regional spoiler in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, but now should be seen as a “multi-dimensional spoiler” that operates across many different geographical and political categories, using violent and non-violent methods, which may even include diplomacy. Several case studies in the South American and African continental inter- and intra-state conflicts also show some developments of this permanent spoiler status, where the larger conflict is not sought to be changed in any ideological way, but simply to be kept in place as the foundation for its own activities.
The United Nations has thoroughly accepted the existence and strategic importance of spoilers in complex conflicts, and they have adapted their extensive conflict management programs and interventions accordingly. The growing realization that many of these conflicts should be resolved by local communities, at the local level, together with a slowly developing incorporation of more women in mediation and conflict negotiation processes constructively include spoiler groups if skillfully managed.
Effective conflict management of modern spoiler involvement History shows a surprisingly simple and spectacularly ineffective initial strategy to get rid of spoilers, after the concept got to be better understood. These unwanted and uninvited actors were sought to be eliminated through force and containment, later on through bribery and other quick-fix strategies. Given our understanding of the goals that spoilers have, it is no wonder that these simplified and hurried strategies failed. A traditional spoiler unit was regarded as not a party to the main conflict.
Their regular manifestation as a much smaller, less organized group, often with only sporadic conflict events to show, understandably minimized them in the eyes of the main actors and their mediators. Initial justifications for such marginalization included lack of legitimacy, relatively small group numbers, undefined or unsophisticated political aims, criminality, and so on. Several of the spoiler groups arising out of the Colombian government and FARC conflicts were met with these dismissals.
The Colombian conflict, as well as several African conflicts such as the DRC and Mali have made it clear that these spoiler groups will need their own strategies, their own negotiations, their own security and resource allocations, and the sooner they are included, at some level, in the overall conflict strategies of preferably all main combatants. The Schiff study has also shown conclusively that multi-dimensional spoilers will require a far more context-sensitive approach, one that includes such actors at various levels.
Early fieldwork indicates that appeasement and compromise with such spoilers should be avoided, and they should either, as part of resolution efforts, be disbanded effectively, or made a part of a more effective, more structured whole, such as for instance democratic processes, economic upliftment and so on. While their demands are often rather simple at first assessment, this is often not so if a sustainable resolution is considered. The level and the extent to which they should be engaged of course goes hand in hand with the potential they have of derailment, delay or large-scale harm. It would be naïve also to leave out of such deliberations the ever-present reality of proxies working with spoilers, an entirely different level of focus.
The position applied to current South African migration conflicts
In the South African political environment in general, and the migration conflicts of 2026 in particular, we find another species of spoiler group. While the full range of such actors are certainly present, such as tribal and cultural, economic and other interest groups, we also have more than one existing political party potentially playing a spoiler role, in addition to their more conventional political functions.
As we see globally, and in other political conflicts in South Africa, the informal role division has the political party attending to the socially and legally acceptable strategies, in casu specifically regarding protests and action against illegal migrants, while certain alignments or overlaps with specific spoiler groups can occur, where more radical action or narratives can be pursued, without traditional liability or public association.
These strategic alliances need not be formalised or even acknowledged, and mere sympathy or the absence of public disavowment from formal structures can achieve results that would otherwise not be possible. The general structure of a spoiler actor – informal structure, a possibly absent leadership formation, vague goals and a chaotic application thereof – are all present in many of these organizations.
Once a structure raises its head above the parapet like March and March has done, it gains the benefit of organization, public visibility and so on, but of course that comes with its own strategic disadvantages as well. This also raises the strategically important question of the difference between a spoiler party and an organization with legitimate aims. In practice, this distinction is important, but not always that easy. Simply put, an organization that has its own, legitimate goals that do not always cohere with that of government policies or the aims of other interest groups, and who aim to pursue those goals as its primary objective, preferably through legitimate means and ends, should not be termed a spoiler organization. They are simply an interest group, an entity that participates in an existing conflict.
At this stage, it is debatable whether groups like March and March actually fall in this category of spoilers. Potential goals of any actual spoiler group in this South African context could be general destabilization, preparing local environments for specific electioneering, developing and mobilizing in-group narratives and so on.
The spoiler actor has its own goals, but it actively sets out to be sand in the machine, to spoil existing or ongoing efforts at resolution. It stands in opposition to at least the current resolution envisaged by other organizations or the main combatants. It is with this distinction that the South African problem comes into sharper focus. Government and security efforts are focused on groups with legitimate, lawful concerns and methods, while the efficiency of hidden spoilers is not adequately addressed. This has important conflict consequences. The wrong parties are targeted, or not included, for intelligence gathering, monitoring and assessment, media narratives are crafted aimed at the wrong parties and identities, and conflict strategies are built on wrong or incomplete foundations.
A few hours before the anticipated June 30th marches, this is exactly what we see in public announcements and official narratives. The spoilers are very active, and not properly engaged as the exhaustive case studies have shown us. At the heart of this miscalculation lies the government’s continued inability to read and apply modern identity conflict dynamics. These anti-migrant conflicts are the quintessential identity conflict, and getting the assessments of involved spoilers wrong means that the narratives and strategies employed, in public and elsewhere, are in many cases not just ineffective, but counterproductive.
This creates, in turn, the harmful escalation and cyclical nature of these deeply problematical national conflicts, leadership failures that are costing the country dearly.
A few proposals on managing the South African spoiler influence in migration conflicts
The spoiler component of these conflicts is of course an important, harmful but very much manageable aspect of the larger conflict, interlinked as it is with inequality, unemployment and other conflict causes. The accurate identification of these spoiler actors should be done urgently, and from then it is a relatively simple conflict exercise of containment, monitoring and, above all, effective neutralizing of these conflict actors through sustainable methods such as integration, disbandment, persuasion, or the effective removal of the conflict cause itself. The present reactive, crisis-management model has been shown to be ineffective and irresponsible, and even if it works for a given conflict event such as the 30th June, the conflict causes remain, conflict rigidity increases, and the can is simply kicked down the road.
Conclusion
The already complex conflict of the migration conflict is badly served by the additional mismanagement of the spoiler complications. The various types of conflict spoiler have, in recent global studies, shown the destructive effect relatively small groups can have when they operate inside larger conflicts, destructive potential which is exacerbated when these groups are ignored, incorrectly assessed and managed, or approached with outdated conflict management strategies.
The South African migration conflict shows troubling evidence of escalation over the last few years, hardly any effective conflict management remedies or progress, and this in itself creates a further breeding ground for several spoiler groups and organizations that makes the conflict even more unstable and combustible. Understanding, and dealing with the spoiler aspect of the conflict will be a relatively manageable place to start building small victories in pursuance of the government’s larger conflict responsibilities. We have run out of time, and these interventions must be attended to as matters of great urgency. As international examples show, the spoiler of today, can become the partner in peace of tomorrow.
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading
1. The Schiff, Martin and Wertman study can be accessed at From Local to Regional Spoiler: Hamas as a Case Study of a Multi-Dimensional Spoiler: Terrorism and Political Violence: Vol 0, No 0 - Get Access
2. A helpful overview of spoiler examples and management can be found in The State of Peacebuilding in Africa, edited by Terence McNamee and Monde Muyangwa, Palgrave Macmillan (2021)
3. My chapter on the development of mediation in global conflicts, which includes the expansion and inclusion of women in local mediation and peace negotiation can be found in The Routledge Handbook of Peacebuilding (2nd edition), edited by Roger Mac Ginty, Routledge (2024)
4. Whole-of-society peacebuilding, edited by Mary Martin and Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovich, Routledge (2019)
5. For articles dealing with the conflict strategies and tactics discussed, see our blog index at Conflict Conversations
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok June 2026
* Author’s note on the use of artificial intelligence in writing this article
I learned to draft, argue and write in the hard school of litigation. I enjoy and value the very human process of creating ideas, of testing my own knowledge and thoughts. It is a process that I need, for answering some of my professional and even personal questions, it is cathartic and inspiring. Other than the most basic research assistance I do not use any AI in the creation of my written work, this article included. It is a matter of pride, of preference, and of mental health. Whether that is a wise choice, I will leave to the reader to decide.