Politics is the art of the possible, the attainable – the art of the next best.
Otto von Bismarck, 1867
This is the first of two conversations. Here I argue that a coalition anchored by ActionSA and the ANC is the best government now available to Johannesburg and Tshwane, and a quietly useful one for the country. In the next piece I argue the opposite with the same conviction. Neither piece is my verdict. Each is the strongest version of a case that parties and voters are making this week.
Introduction
The 4 November vote was a clear advance for the DA in Gauteng's metros, and a rout for the ANC. It came first in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni, and it came first in none of them with a majority.[1] In Johannesburg it holds 91 of 270 seats, against 63 for the ANC and 43 for ActionSA. In Tshwane it holds 74 of 214, against 48 for ActionSA and 44 for the ANC.[2] The instinctive reaction in many suburbs is already settled: the DA won, and anything else is unfair, undemocratic, harmful. I understand the reaction.
Readers of my COALITION CHAOS pieces will remember that I floated a plurality convention for Johannesburg myself. Devil's advocacy now requires me to argue against my own instinct. That is exactly the discipline sincere conflict work demands: you do not understand a position until you can make its case better than its owners do. The shape now forming is a bloc of ActionSA, the ANC, the EFF and MK, give or take a small party here or there. On current numbers it would hold 138 seats in Johannesburg and 109 in Tshwane, a majority in both.[3] The case for it rests on five pillars: democratic arithmetic, a tested relationship, the primacy of the contract over the chain, the logic of better conflict, and a national dividend. I take them in turn, and then I face the hardest objections head-on.
1. A plurality is not a mandate
The first pillar is simple arithmetic, and it is the one the coalition's critics most need to hear. In Johannesburg the DA won roughly a third of the seats. In Tshwane it won about 35%.[2] Put the other way round, around two-thirds of voters in both cities chose someone other than the DA. Coming first is an achievement. It is not a mandate. The parties at the core of this coalition outpolled the DA on their own. ActionSA and the ANC together hold 106 seats in Johannesburg against the DA's 91, and 92 in Tshwane against its 74.[2] In Tshwane, ActionSA climbed to about 22.7% on the back of Mayor Nasiphi Moya's record, after the DA's own all-in campaign.[4] Voters who wanted that government to continue are not a footnote to the result. They are a large part of it.
Our local government system is built on proportional representation, and PR systems exist precisely so that governments are formed in council, not on election night. The test in a hung council is not "who came first?" but "who can command a majority and keep it?".
Mature democracies apply that test routinely and survive it. In New Zealand in 2017, National was comfortably the largest party, yet Labour formed the government with NZ First and the Greens.[5] In Portugal in 2015, the centre-right came first, yet António Costa's left-wing arrangement, mocked as the geringonça (the contraption), governed for a full term.[5] In Germany in 1969, the CDU/CSU was the largest bloc, yet Willy Brandt's SPD–FDP coalition took office and reshaped the country.[5] None of these is remembered as a theft.
The coalition conflict literature says the same thing more formally. William Riker's size principle predicts that rational parties form the smallest coalition that can win, not the one that flatters the largest party.[6] A government that assembles a working majority in council is not a distortion of the vote. It is the vote, translated into council.
2. A tested relationship beats a promising one
The second pillar is the one I find most persuasive as a conflict practitioner. Coalitions do not fail on paper. They fail in relationships. The Centre for Development and Enterprise put the diagnosis bluntly before the election. Johannesburg has had nine mayors and eight coalitions since 2016, and no mayor has completed a full five-year term. The CDE named political instability, not infrastructure, as the primary cause of the city's decline.[7]
If stability is the scarce resource, the question becomes: which combination of parties has actually produced it? The honest answer is Tshwane after October 2024. Nasiphi Moya took office with ANC and EFF support,[8] in a metro that had already been through three administrations since 2021.[9] She then governed until the election. Her administration claims stabilised finances, lower Eskom arrears and a recovering service base.[10] Her critics dispute much of that, and I deal with the audit record below. But the relationship held, and voters rewarded the party that led it.
Robert Axelrod's work on cooperation explains why this matters. Cooperation between rivals becomes stable when they expect to meet again and have learned how the other behaves.[11] He called it the shadow of the future. ActionSA and the ANC have two years of shared budgets, crises and quarrels behind them, including real failures such as the removal of ActionSA's Johannesburg speaker in 2025.[12] They know each other's red lines. That is an asset, not a weakness.
Now compare the alternative. ActionSA walked out of the DA-led Tshwane coalition in 2024 after the DA approached the ANC about a grand coalition that would have sidelined it.[13] Last week, Herman Mashaba made Helen Zille's withdrawal a precondition for any Johannesburg deal with the DA.[14] Karen Jehn's research on group conflict draws a sharp line between task conflict, which can improve decisions, and relationship conflict, which reliably degrades performance.[15]
A DA–ActionSA government would begin with relationship conflict at the very top. Building a city on that foundation is a bet against the evidence.
3. How much does the mayoral chain really matter?
Much of the public argument is about who wears the mayoral chain. Dr. Moya stays in Tshwane, almost certainly. In Johannesburg the chain may go to the ANC or to ActionSA. My third pillar is that, for residents, this matters far less than the noise suggests. Johannesburg has already run the experiment. Kabelo Gwamanda of Al Jama-ah, a party with a single seat, wore the chain in 2023 and 2024 while larger parties held the portfolios that mattered.[16] The chain was ceremonial.
Power sat in the mayoral committee and in the council votes behind it. In a hung council an executive mayor governs only for as long as the coalition agreement holds. Comparative research points the same way. Gamson's Law, one of the most robust findings in coalition studies, shows that partners receive cabinet posts roughly in proportion to the seats they bring.[17] Lanny Martin and Georg Vanberg show that partners then protect their interests less through the top job than through monitoring: committee scrutiny, shared oversight and the power to expose a partner who drifts.[18]
What decides a coalition's quality is who holds finance, water, electricity and infrastructure, and how tightly each partner can watch the others. So the real questions for this coalition are not about the chain. Is the agreement published? Are the service portfolios matched to competence rather than handed out as spoils? Is there a dispute ladder short of a motion of no confidence? Is there a firewall between political deal-making and senior appointments, as the CDE has urged?[19] Get those right, and it hardly matters whose name is on the mayor's door. Get them wrong, and no name will save the city.
4. We do not need less conflict, we need better conflict
The fourth pillar comes from the heart of conflict theory, and it is where the case becomes more than tactical. Our metros are still shaped by apartheid geography. Local government is where that legacy is most concrete: whose streets are fixed, whose water returns first, whose informal settlement gets a plan.
Edward Azar showed that protracted social conflict grows where identity groups feel shut out of the institutions that meet their basic needs.[20] Donald Horowitz warned that in divided societies elections can harden into identity censuses, where losing feels like exclusion rather than a turn in opposition.[21] Our political leaders, for some reason, avoid integrating identity conflicts into their strategies, even though we are arguably one of the best conflict laboratories for exactly that dynamic.
Read through that lens, this coalition has a quality its critics underrate. ActionSA grew in both suburbs and townships this year,[22] which makes it one of the few genuine bridging parties in Gauteng. Joined to the ANC's remaining base, it gives a broad cross-section of the metros a stake in government. Arend Lijphart's work on power-sharing argues that such inclusion is a stabiliser in divided societies, because groups that govern together have less reason to fight the system itself.[23] The DA, meanwhile, does not disappear. With 91 seats in Johannesburg and 74 in Tshwane, it becomes the strongest municipal opposition either city has seen in years.
Chantal Mouffe's distinction is useful here: democracy needs adversaries, not enemies, and a vigorous opposition is the healthy form of political conflict, not its failure.[24] A large, competent DA scrutinising budgets and tenders is exactly the pressure a coalition with the ANC inside it needs. Government by a broad coalition, watched by a strong opposition, is better conflict. It channels disagreement into institutions instead of into the street.
5. The national dividend
The fifth pillar looks beyond Gauteng. The ANC's national vote fell to 30.76%, its worst result in a local election since democracy, while MK took almost 10%.[25] South Africa is now a coalition country at every level. How its two largest parties behave in that new world matters more than any single mayoralty. Start with the risk of fusion. The DA and the ANC already govern together nationally in the GNU. If they also carve up Gauteng's metros, voters who are unhappy with both are left with no meaningful alternative inside the system.
Richard Katz and Peter Mair called this the cartel party problem: when the main parties share office everywhere, discontent drains towards anti-system movements.[26] With MK near 10%, that is not an abstract worry. A DA that governs nationally but opposes in Johannesburg and Tshwane keeps real contestation alive, which Robert Dahl placed at the centre of any working democracy.[27] Splitting the levels is also normal elsewhere. German states regularly run coalitions that look nothing like the federal government in Berlin, and the federation survives. The GNU should be mature enough to survive a metro outcome it did not design.
There are reports that President Ramaphosa is comfortable with a Johannesburg arrangement without the DA,[28] which suggests the ANC's leadership thinks so too. Finally, there is the education of the ANC. A party that governed alone for three decades must now learn to be a junior partner, under another party's mayor, bound by another party's priorities. Tshwane has been its classroom since 2024. If the ANC can serve credibly under ActionSA in the capital, that is good practice for the national coalitions that lie ahead. It is far better learned in a metro than in the Union Buildings.
6. The hard objections, met head-on
A case that only works when its weaknesses stay hidden is not worth making. Here are the four strongest objections, in their best form.
"It needs the EFF and MK"
It does, and that is the price of the arithmetic. Together they bring 32 seats in Johannesburg and 17 in Tshwane, as junior partners bound by a written agreement. ActionSA has governed Tshwane with EFF support since 2024 without the city falling over.[8]
"Tshwane's audits did not improve"
This is the most serious charge. The Auditor-General gave Tshwane a qualified opinion for the third year running, and the DA argues the city has gone backwards, citing a cash deficit of about R4 billion.[29] Moya calls it a city in recovery, not in crisis.[29] Both can be partly true. A qualified audit was also the outcome under the previous DA-led administration.[30] Turnarounds take longer than one audit cycle. Changing government again would reset every remedial plan, which is precisely the churn the CDE warns against.
"A one-seat majority in Tshwane is a coalition waiting to collapse"
It is thin, and I will not pretend otherwise. But the alternatives are thin too. A DA–ActionSA pact would hold only 134 seats in Johannesburg, short of the 136 needed, so it would also depend on smaller parties.[3] Portugal's geringonça governed for a full term on a fragile parliamentary majority because its partners wrote down their terms and kept them.[5] Stability comes from the contract and the dispute ladder, not the size of the margin.
"This isolates the DA and lets ANC capture back in"
The ANC's presence is the real risk, and it is why the safeguards in pillar three are non-negotiable. But two points cut the other way. First, the DA was offered a route in: Mashaba proposed that the DA keep the Johannesburg mayoralty under a different candidate.[14] If the DA declines that, its isolation is at least partly its own choice. Second, an isolated DA is not a powerless DA. With a third of each council, it will be the sharpest watchdog these coalitions have ever faced.
A closing word: the next best
Bismarck's line at the top of my piece is usually quoted as a shrug. I read it as a discipline. The best government for Johannesburg and Tshwane is not the one that would exist in a perfect council. It is the best one that can actually be built from the council the voters elected, and then kept standing.
On that test, the case for an ActionSA–ANC coalition is strong. It reflects how most voters actually voted. It rests on a relationship that has already been tested under pressure. It puts the contract above the chain. It gives a broad cross-section of each city a stake in government, under the eye of a powerful opposition. And it keeps South Africa's two largest parties from fusing into a single establishment at a moment when anti-system politics is on the rise. None of this guarantees success. Coalitions are made to work; they are never simply formed.
The question is not whether this coalition is perfect. The question is whether it is the next best thing these cities can realistically have. The case for it says: yes, and by some distance. In the next conversation I argue for the other side.
REFERENCES AND SUGGESTED READING
Notes
Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.
(c) Andre Vlok
November 2026