Lobbying is part of political life in the European Union (EU). It is particularly striking how much the political representation of interests is a normal part of what happens in Brussels.
Christian Lahusen
Introduction, and the general thesis of the article
On the 24th January this year, President Ramaphosa in a public speech stated that “The forces of right wing imperialism, both globally and domestically, are seemingly on the offensive and we need to ensure that our movement and our government take appropriate action to protect our nation and its people.” (see link below).
This builds on a series of similar and escalating public statements made against minority lobbying groups Afriforum and Solidariteit during the preceding 12 months. On the 10th January this year, for example, claimed that Afriforum and Solidariteit are undermining South Africa’s democracy through their lobbying efforts, particularly in the US. This follows a clear path of escalating conflict between the government and these two groups (I will, for convenience, occasionally use the term AfriSol, as this seems to have gathered some traction in media discussions). For our purposes we can limit that focus to the escalations since January of 2025, coinciding with the start of the second Trump administration.
The various visits by these two lobby groups to the US are covered extensively in local and overseas media, and much of the content of their lobbying narratives are common cause. Complaints about their views on farm murders, violence directed at the minority white group, expropriation without compensation, so-called racist legislation and so on are clearly stated and consistently used by these groups.
A few important factual errors, misunderstandings and disinformation campaigns involving the so-called white genocide against South Africans have needlessly complicated an already complex and volatile conflict, with President Trump still claiming publicly, as recently as January of 2026, that this white genocide is ongoing in South Africa. The development of the conflict to the point where the US is actively pursuing and facilitating the relocation of a number of so-called Afrikaans refugees did nothing to calm these turbulent waters.
What would seem to have been a series of factual and legal allegations that should have been capable of relatively easy adjudication and objective observation has remained a combustible cause of current and near-inevitable future complex conflict.
Two main suggestions as to how the South African government should deal with the situation have evolved during this last year. The first of these suggests that these lobbying efforts are best ignored, the second suggest that formal action be taken against the lobbyists. On the 8th January 2026, and now again on the 24th January, President Ramaphosa mused about possible government action being taken against such parties. This conflict is clearly not of short duration, and the lobbying are resulting in real world consequences.
The article sets out to understand what lobbying entails, to compare our approach to lobbying with comparative global developments and arcs of response, and to then weigh up a few positives and negatives in assessing the government’s best options in its response. Throughout this discussion I will purposefully approach the issues through a conflict studies lens, and not a political one.
The simple question then, to be considered, is “How best does the South African government deal with this?”
What is lobbying?
International lobbying is a rather easily understood concept, and we need not spend too much time on defining it. In formal research terms it is simply the efforts of nonstate actors (NGO, civil society, trade associations etc) to influence the decisions, decision-making processes, policies and legislative activities of other countries or organizations, mainly through consultation, informal engagements, the exchange of information, viewpoints and expertise.
It is built on access, on influence, as much as it may involve the use of objective facts and arguments. It seeks to elicit aid in some form or another, as may be appropriate to the given moment and need of the lobbyists, and may involve a trade of value, or simply a one-sided benefit.
Modern developments and limitations on lobbying – a brief comparative study
Formal lobbying, with professional expert lobbyists involved, have for decades been a rather standard and accepted part of US and European political and diplomatic life. Influencing, deal-making, stating your case in private – what can be wrong with that? Or so the conventional wisdom had it. In recent years there has however been a growing understanding that unfettered lobbying may not be in the best interests of countries.
Arguments are presented in private, often without the right of reply, incentive structures can be discussed and negotiated that may be based on incomplete representations, and far-reaching decisions, including legislation, may follow on these lobbying projects. We have come to realise that in this way, and given the high level of skills exhibited by some lobbyists, this mechanism can bypass democratically expressed views and decisions that are taken based on the common good and a balance of interests and sacrifices that are not adequately or fairly represented during such lobbying campaigns. It seems, upon reflection, at times to be a low-level assault on the very sovereignty of a nation on the receiving end.
Professor of sociology Christian Lahusen confirms this as far as the highly professionalized and developed European lobbying environment is concerned:
However, research is acknowledging that European lobbyists merit more attention. These professionals are not mere representatives of their organisations, but active participants in the formation and reproduction of the field.
(Lahusen 14)
The European Union, as one example, is debating and starting to implement a professionalization of the lobbying field, in recognition of the potential impact that lobbying has, and may have. The geopolitical tensions arising from the power realignments of the move to multi-polarity, corporate capture and scandals involving foreign agents all underscore a need for a more formal approach, even the regulation, of this powerful tool of persuasion. The 2021 improvements to the applicability and enforcement of the EU Transparency Register and 2025 increased rules for transparency for foreign lobbying by the European Parliament all show the trajectory of an increased monitoring and regulation of lobbying.
In the United States the strengthening and enforcement of the Foreign Agents Registration Act (1938) and the 2025 unanimous Senate passing of the Lobbying Disclosure Improvement Act and the Disclosing Foreign Influence Act emphasizes, through their mere presence, the increasing scepticism and concern about unrestricted lobbying. These policy and praxis shifts are cautious and not without their critics, but the momentum and ultimate goals are clear enough.
South Africa itself has no direct comparable regulation or legislation, and the best argument at this stage will have to be based on indirect and implied guidelines such as the various financial monitoring proposals, warnings on foreign actors and so on. This lacuna has been critiqued by scholars and organizations such as Just Share, and we will return to this position later on in this article.
The arguments against AfriSol
Publicly expressed criticism against these lobbying efforts include that they are divisive, unpatriotic, treasonous, untrue and that it harms the people of South Africa through disinformation, the loss of financing, jobs and good standing, that it influences the US in its policy and legislative decision making processes, and that their efforts have destroyed the good working relationship between South Africa and the US.
The accusations, from government and the wider South African media and general population, also seem to include that these lobbying projects have caused, or exacerbated, the Afrikaner refugee situation and the persistent accusation from some quarters that a white genocide is being perpetrated and allowed in South Africa. In addition to harm, many also experience these events playing out on global screens as rather embarrassing.
The fractious spectacle of President Ramaphosa and President Trump meeting in the White House on the 21st May 2025 is often used as evidence of the harm that AfriSol’s lobbying does, a topic to which we will return to later herein.
From their perspective, the lobbying groups have repeatedly denied that they have started or perpetuated the “white genocide” line of attack, and they claim that they are simply stating their views to a powerful external actor that could assist them in reaching their legitimate goals. They frame their lobbying as the pursuit of legitimate rights, and as necessary given the government’s complicity, inactivity or ineffectiveness in these various complaints. By their lights legislation such as the BELA Act, the Expropriation Act, and the application of racial quotas or the existence of the farm murder situation, as they see this, the government allowing the public singing of racial hatred songs like “Kill the boer” and so on all justify their active lobbying. The conflict of the last year has seen a probe by the Hawks, the institution or threatening of civil suits and other related conflicts connected to the main line of unresolved conflicts.
Stating the question from a conflict management perspective Approaching the conflict from a specific party-political or identity group perspective ties us into the biases and limitations of partisanship, in-group loyalty and pressures, and other identity conflict obstacles. We vote with our group, we say what we are expected to say, and the polarization and entrenchment of the conflict simply escalate.
Approaching this complex national conflict from a conflict management perspective, on the other hand, allows us access to various perspectives and solutions that would otherwise be difficult to notice or to implement. Simply working with the advanced tools of modern conflict studies and practice, we apply questions of timing and sequence, of the controlled escalation or de-escalation of certain aspects of the conflict towards management or resolution, we develop problem-solving responses built on joint interests, and we make sure that such solutions are crafted with a full understanding of the dynamics of face saving and the destructive effects of getting that wrong.
These various items, examples of what is available, show us a clear and more effective path to the management, resolution or even transformation of this conflict. Add to that the important observation that the situation will not resolve itself, or go away, that it sits there on our national landscape like an unexploded landmine, and the need and urgency to effectively deal with this becomes apparent. We then get to face the earlier question: should these lobbying efforts be limited, punished, or ignored?
To limit, penalize or not
If we accept, from that conflict management perspective, that this lobbying is indeed harmful, and we are sceptical about the divide between the parties being traversed with any success, the question of the limitation of these lobbying projects becomes imperative. Globally, there are several examples of simple bans, in written or implied form. Thou shall not lobby, end of argument.
Legislation, including sanctions against perpetrators, is one way of simply stopping such efforts. This option however does not translate into that great an answer in reality, of course. Legislation simply drives such efforts underground, and the same people will still be speaking to each other, saying the same things, while the government position is weakened by an apparently autocratic and insecure step.
Heavy sanctions for the breach of such legislation is also a limited deterrent. It can never be retrospective, and given the vague, really non-existent status of current South African guardrails against lobbying, any attempt at retrospective punishment, or the use of treason as an argument, would be stillborn. Such legislation or regulation, even limitation, of course also creates almost instantaneous martyrdom and victimhood, with perceived justification in some of the places of public debate.
A more structured project of regulation in a professional and ethical sense would certainly be in line with US and European standards and current best practices, and could be a very good solution in part, as could framework legislation, to an extent. Again, it may be a naïve attempt at curtailing what people want to tell each other, and may be completely unenforceable given current intergovernmental tensions between SA and the US.
Needless to say, the banning or restricting of the more general activities of these groups or individuals would be counterproductive in the extreme. It would be irresponsible leadership and conflict assessment to dismiss AfriSol as a small minority pressure groups. Of course they are small groups, unrepresentative of the larger groups that are, in themselves, minority groups, but the identity conflict roots of these topics extend too deep into the South African psyche to dismiss them on those numbers alone. We should make no mistake as to the potential for much greater conflict these current narratives have if mismanaged.
Assessment
From its public commentary on the developing situation, the government views these lobbying efforts as serious, harmful and unacceptable. Unusually strong language is used, and there is a clear escalation of tension and resolve building up, all simmering against the backdrop of a crucially important year of elections, involving an ANC that is struggling with existential challenges. If the arguments against some form of banning, limitation or punitive response are accepted, what remains available to the government?
I would argue that simply ignoring the conflict, in the conflict avoidant style so beloved of the ANC (if not the GNU more generally), is as bad a conflict management strategy as the abovementioned limitations. Ignoring the problem will not make it go away, and to wait out the Trump administration (as is often suggested) is simply unskilful and poor leadership.
What then can be done, not so much as a choice among many, but as a superior conflict management strategy?
Conclusion and alternative conflict strategies
As an essential point of departure, and in order to see any subsequent strategy in its proper perspective, the first question should be the extent of any harm done by AfriSol in the first place.
Government and even civil society in South Africa still show a noticeably personalized response to conflicts like lobbying and secession debates. These are all globally accepted methods of influencing and conflict resolution, and we should stop seeing these necessarily as insults or attacks. Deal with these efforts on their merits.
I believe that these two lobbying groups are quite effective at what they do, but in a very limited receiving group. It is absurd to believe that their efforts bring anything new to Washington, or that any of their allegations, submissions or arguments cannot be verified with a telephone call or two. Without exception, all of their arguments are playing out in the public arena in South Africa, and the essence of the arguments are all either public knowledge or easily ascertainable.
It is important to place their lobbying against the backdrop of our deteriorated political relationship with the US at this time. I remain convinced that the AfriSol lobbying efforts are little more than the proverbial sticks to beat the dog with. Our international relationships with the “enemies” of the US, which may or may not include Russia, Iran, China and others, our ICJ case, and a range of other real or speculated causes are all much closer to the causes of all of this than the lobbying of a small minority group. AfriSol have, in my view naively, by their lobbying become nothing but a convenient reason and effective narrative point to Trump’s base to launch these attacks on South Africa, a campaign that I believe we have not seen the end of yet.
If so, the problem of course remains, especially as an internal political issue, but it removes some of the perceived pressure of international harm and perceptions.
By now, all of the US’ friends and allies have been on the receiving end of these bizarre attacks and policy positions. I doubt that ours were caused by Afriforum’s lobbying, or in other words, that if AfriSol stayed at home would we have had a warm and friendly relationship with the Trump administration.
As general conflict principles, the state would want to either manage or resolve the conflict, with transformation maybe too ambitious a goal. Such a solution should studiously avoid appeasement or unskilful compromise, as this simply kicks this loud can down the road. It should be marked by a high level of understanding and application of the dynamics of identity conflicts, including those relating to face saving mechanisms and strategies. Case studies show us the remarkable lengths to which people will go to spoil solutions, even to their own detriment, if these dynamics are misunderstood or misapplied.
More specifically, start with the following strategies:
(a) Lobby better.
This is an age-old conflict strategy in response to opposing lobbyists. Allow them to state their case, then simply outdo them. Have the confidence in your cause and your abilities that you can do so. Build the right team, prepare the right case, and go and out-lobby the lobbyists.
(b) Sit down and meet with AfriSol.
Have those hard, unpleasant conversations. Agree to a few rules, and let the sunlight in. Develop solutions, joint interests, show confidence and ability. Accept that these are people with legitimate concerns and that this is their way of expressing it. Accept that your own poor conflict management up to here has left them, in their assessment, with no reasonable alternatives but to do this, and then give them alternatives. Work towards joint meetings with the Trump administration. Imagine the tremendous benefits, for the country, the government, the parties involved, if these negotiations manage to resolve a few of our cyclical, unresolved national conflicts.
(c) Communicate better.
Conflict communication has become a fine art, and our government is particularly poor at this – content, timing, and sequence. If you believe in your facts and your cause, tell your story. The narratives are out there in detail, and they have all reached saturation point, so there is no argument of giving more attention to a limited cause. So many of the public talking points around this lobbying are pure fiction – the genocide, the hundreds of race laws – correct this in an effective way. Again, learn how identity conflicts influence and shape your messaging. Do more to remove the causes of fear and uncertainty. Be honest with South Africans – dispel the myths effectively, and own up publicly to the hard parts.
(d) Upgrade the conflict competencies of your involved personnel.
So many aspects of the current situation the government finds itself in are own goals, caused and perpetuated by clumsy and unskilled knowledge and experience of the conflict options and tools that are available to the government.
Lobbyists are the political salesmen and women of ideas. They use a specific method of influencing decisions. Most of the power they have in that arena is what their opponents give them, through poor leadership, strategic mismanagement and conflict incompetency.
Managing the involved national conflicts effectively would have seen to it that we would never have gotten to this point. After that, sitting in a corner sulking for another year is equally not an effective strategy.
As our brief discussion shows, this entire harmful episode runs on predictable and manageable conflict principles. Even now, dealing with it effectively presents wonderful opportunities to our government and all involved. Instead of creating situations that can be abused and used against our nation, we can use these events as fuel to a better place, we can show each other that we can actually start to be effective in dealing with seemingly intractable conflicts. We still have time to benefit from this.
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading
1. While focused (as is most available research material) on European lobbying, the book European Lobbying by Christian Lahusen (Routledge Studies in Political Sociology), Taylor & Francis (2023) is very helpful in its discussion of the reasons for an increase in lobbying professionalization and regulation.
2. The link to the section of President Ramaphosa’s speech of 24 January 2024, in the first paragraph: https://x.com/SABCNews/status/2014985776967065715?s=20
3. Relevant articles for related conflict work, such as identity conflicts, and their source material, can be found at www.conflict-conversations.co.za
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok
January 2026