Those who can make you believe absurdities can make you commit atrocities.
Voltaire
Introduction
On the 12th May 2025, US president Donald Trump, during a press event, defended his earlier attacks on the South African government inter alia with the following statement: “Because they’re being killed. And we don’t want to see people be killed. But it’s a genocide that’s taking place that you people don’t want to write about. White farmers are being brutally killed and their land is being confiscated in South Africa.”
Just over a week later, on May the 21st, in his unedifying Oval Office meeting with president Cyril Ramaphosa, Trump repeated the accusation of the South African government’s genocide against white farmers, along with various claims and purported examples of this and other serious alleged political and legal abuses being perpetrated against this group.
These were not isolated, off-the-cuff remarks by Trump. If only they were. Nearly a year later, on the 18th April 2026, he repeated this very clear and specific accusation against the South African government. Again these accusations were linked to the so-called refugee exemptions and the program of allowing white South African farmers to settle in the US. No other government or national leader has joined Trump in these accusations.
Individual commentators, such as Tucker Carlson and Elon Musk, have referenced the possibility of genocide (such as Julius Malema’s “Kill the boer” chants), but of course none of those direct and implied accusations carry the same weight as those emanating from the US president.
The limits of our assessment
In this article, I will not be discussing the merits of accusations themselves. To accuse the South African government of being guilty of genocide shows a troubling level of ignorance and/or malice insofar as the meaning of the crime itself is concerned. These accusations are absurd and scurrilous in the extreme.
We will similarly not be spending time here on the motives for the spreading of these untruths, whether they are simply uniquely telling examples of ignorance, or somehow connected to creating justification for the so-called Afrikaner refugee programs, or payback for South Africa’s 2023 filing of its case alleging genocide against Israel in the International Court of Justice, or any other reason, need not detain us here.
Merits and pushback, and the South African internal understanding
The accusations of genocide are without merit, and mere assertions. Several attempts by advocates for the position collapse under the slightest scrutiny, and the more recent attempts to widen the understanding of “genocide” show the stillborn nature of the project, and in any event waters down the concept of “genocide” to the point of meaninglessness.
Other than president Trump, in his bizarre attacks against the South African government that started in early 2025, a few public commentators and a certain section of South African society, no one is repeating these absurdities. No other national leader, no NGO, no religious leaders – no one. Tellingly, the Israeli government itself has never accused the South African government of perpetrating genocide.
These accusations are expressly rejected by a several influential and significant, in this context, voices. Gregory Stanton, president of Genocide Watch, has placed South Africa at various “stages” of his genocide model (“preparation”, and “polarization”), but Stanton specifically denies that South Africa is busy with a “white genocide”, and he has in fact been critical of these exaggerated claims.
The UN Human Rights Office strongly rejected it in 2025:
"These are very serious issues. One should not use this word [genocide] casually without deep knowledge of what this means. Looking at the history of South Africa, it is wholly inappropriate" (UNHRO spokesperson Ravina Shamdasani)
Human Rights Watch reject these accusations, and are particularly critical of the narrative trying to elevate the grim farm murder statistics to the level of a genocide. The purported causal link between farm murder statistics and the genocide allegation is also refuted by South African Police Services statistics, and a range of earlier independent inquiries.
In South Africa itself, the accusations are far from accepted as accurate or common cause. In an important March 2026 survey conducted by South Africa’s Institute for Race Relations, 71% of South Africans overall disagreed with Trump’s allegations of white genocide, with 20% agreeing and the rest being unsure or unwilling to answer. The race group breakdown of the survey can be found at Most White South Africans Disagree with Donald Trump’s Claims on
Of white South Africans surveyed, 50% disagreed, 35 agreed, with the balance being unsure or unwilling to answer.
Conservative and white interests in South Africa are very visibly championed by inter alia the special interest and lobbying groups Afriforum and Solidariteit. Both of these groups have in very clear language rejected these claims of white genocide, Afriforum in public clarifications and declarations (November / December 2025, and March 2026, by CEO Kallie Kriel, and expanded upon and repeated in several interviews and talkshows), and Solidariteit consistently throughout 2025 and 2026, through TV interviews and statements. Both these groups go further than denials of these allegations, as they have filed several press council complaints and litigation clarifying their stance on this matter.
The only instances where the allegations are really advanced is via the occasional ill-considered media allegation or tortuous social media arguments.
The temptation to ignore
If the allegations are so baseless, so easily refuted, and so poorly supported and strongly opposed, should they not simply be ignored? This is a tempting proposition.
President Trump’s second administration has been beset by the most bizarre events and accusations, including US claims on and public threats against Canada, Greenland, Cuba and others. US allies and enemies alike are increasingly viewing this US administration and its conduct as irrational, unstable and untrustworthy. This line of thought would simply have South Africa duck for cover, and ride out the storm until this US administration comes to an end.
But there are several reasons militating against this seemingly safe approach, I would argue. I believe, and have argued, that we took too supine a view when the Trump administration unilaterally removed South Africa from the G20 activities. While we are reassured by allies and other G20 members that this is a temporary measure, and while we can of course ameliorate some of the harm done in this embarrassing process, a sovereign country should not be seen to simply acquiesce in abominable treatment by another.
Whether we like this or not, this sets a tone and precedent as to what we will tolerate, and our meek acceptance of that treatment will, in my view, have future adverse consequences for us. In the time of a resetting of global multilateral power alignments, and a reversion to geopolitical realism, you do not want to be seen as the weak kid in class, and our responses, or lack thereof, in that infamous example, were not inspiring. And what guarantee do we have that these attacks are necessarily only linked to the polarizing figure of president Trump, and that a new political leader, or a new administration, will not simply repeat the accusations, or build on these placid acceptances of ours?
We should not seek to repeat and transfer the indecision and passivity so characteristic of our internal government leadership policies and conduct to our geopolitical conflict management. There are other real-world examples counting against such a policy of ignoring these baseless accusations. They are not mere differences of opinion or critiques of a government style or result (of which we offer the world all too many examples).
Accusations of government-run genocide against white farmers are some of the worst things that can be levelled against a government. There is the matter of principle, of being seen to not allow these types of accusations to go unchallenged, of being conflict competent in these epoch-defining times, and of valuing and protecting our sovereignty.
This Trump administration has repeatedly shown that it is very willing to embark on selfish and unlawful campaigns against other countries. Compromise and passivity have not served any other country well in their dealing with this administration, on the contrary often being repaid by further contempt and demands.
As we have seen with Venezuela and Iran, perceived weakness may very well lead to aggression and hostility. Cuba seems to be next on the list, with even Canada and Greenland, to name but a few examples, remaining on the radar screens of this seemingly unconstrained world power. Lessons from Iran, Canada and Greenland, among others, show us that a principled, conflict competent and unflinching response to threats and insults serve the interests of the receiving country better than a passive acceptance. The repetitive and sustained nature of these accusations against South Africa tell us that they were not isolated events, and that, as we see in other global examples, these initial harassments so often develop into full-blown aggression from the US.
Conflict avoidant behaviour, in an unstable and disparate power-differential environment such as is the case here, creates a false but temporary sense of safety, and it also creates an increase in resentment, polarization and the other recognized harm resulting from cyclical, unresolved complex conflicts. The siren call of “Just let it go, for now”, should be resisted.
Possible conflict remedies:
In assessing South Africa’s conflict options in response to these accusations, it is of course a simple and uncontentious point of departure that such responses should not make matters worse. In geopolitical conflict, the least worst option is often the best that can be achieved. An informed, unemotional and long-term view is called for. Assessing, and implementing, the available and strategically prudent conflict responses should of course not be seen as a static, once-off exercise. The smallest change in personnel, leadership, or geopolitical event can bring crucial nuance and a changed perspective to the building blocks of the challenge as it exists at the moment.
Both the option evaluation and the execution of selected strategies should rather be approached as a dynamic and ongoing process, sensitive to change at a moment’s notice. I have divided our assessment into a few logical categories, in order to aid our eventual conclusions.
(a) Diplomatic and political remedies
Diplomacy used to have consequences and effects in the real world. A country publicly rebuking another’s conduct, a statement expressing concern or disapproval after an event, or a strongly worded condemnation hinting at further consequences often sufficed to correct the wayward conduct of a particular nation. The last 18 months have of course put an effective end to that, at least for the foreseeable future. Geopolitical realism and the abrasive communication style of the Trump administration means that a crude form of strongman politics is back in vogue in certain circles, and in the process the art of subtle diplomacy has lost much of its current power. Missiles don’t care about your feelings, or something similar.
But there are, nevertheless, diplomatically worthwhile options, as I intend to show. Here, I want to start developing my argument into two distinct but related tracks: one, conflict remedies that are, at some level, effective, and two, the mere recording of objections, a steadfast refusal to be disrespected this way, and for the record to reflect that, consistently, regardless of the real or perceived success of the strategies used in track one.
The obvious start to this process would be the issuing of formal diplomatic notes (démarches or notes verbales), through South Africa’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) to the US Embassy or State Department. These formal notices can record a wide range of objections, set out factual inaccuracies and demand retractions and apologies. While this has already been employed by DIRCO, this must be sustained, both as far as repeated demands for existing statements and for any future disinformation events.
The message must become the weapon, keep on filing these communications, linked to appropriate media and social media support. Keep a sustained level of narrative, highlighting the irrational and unfounded accusations, and increasingly, the absence of any apology. Do not accept that the message is best kept dark, light it up regularly. The success of these on track one become irrelevant, track two reminds others of your ability to set the narrative, and that you do not hide in corners when the message is uncomfortable. Learn from the Iran Lego videos – the power lies in the refusal to accept, the refusal to agree to the narrative, the refusal to be a victim.
In this same spirit, hammer out carefully crafted statements and condemnations at appropriate times and events at the UN General Assembly, UN Human Rights Council, African Union (AU) Peace and Security Council, and even G20 related events and media opportunities. Link (belatedly) the irrationality, the unfounded punishment, of the genocide allegations with the G20 removal. Create a cost for these statements from the Trump administration, let them start arguing internally about that cost.
At this stage, those accusations are revived when they want it to happen, at no real political costs. In the same diplomatic category, high level work must be done in aggressive lobbying for the retraction of these statements, as well as an unconditional apology from this administration, or the next. Continue with this, even as a long-term project. Keep it in the public eye, but do hard work behind closed doors. Do not minimize this, do not let it become a bad thing that happened, and that no one talks about. Roelf Meyer should place this on his agenda to address, and keep it there until it is fully resolved.
(b) Legal remedies
The above diplomatic strategies align with the UN Charter’s emphasis on peaceful dispute settlement (Art. 2(3)–(4) and Chapter VI). They are, as far as I am concerned, as close as the conflict will come to offering any legal remedies available to South Africa. Conventional legal remedies just face insurmountable obstacles in a complaint such as this one. Jurisdictional to substantive, procedural and justiciability obstacles, to name but a few, make this category a non-starter in my view. Even the International Court of Justice option, which seems like such an instinctive place to turn to in situations like these, would be an ineffective and stillborn exercise, given the unusual provision of the requirement of the US’s approval to be a party to litigation, a rather fatal reservation to the standard Article IX Genocide Convention protection. Similar high walls defeat any litigation in the International Criminal Court, or even domestic civil or criminal courts. A symbolic court case brought here would, in my view, be counterproductive, and an unwarranted abuse of the court process.
(c) Trade and economic remedies
If these genocide allegations at some stage translate into punitive economic measures (e.g. aid cuts, AGOA suspension, tariffs, or sanctions under the February 2025 Executive Order), the RSA may invoke a range of trade law responses, either as standalone or combined strategies. Outside of such direct economic prejudices serving as future triggers for those remedies, the genocide accusations can of course also be used to lever our responses in direct trade negotiations, and consequences for these attacks can be built into pricing structures, favoured trade partner agreements and so on.
Much of this will need to be addressed in high-level trade delegations, lobbying and bilateral trade negotiations, with the earlier discussed diplomatic options playing a monitoring and supportive role in such negotiations. The retraction of such allegations should form part of broader trade negotiations, and in the hands of skilled negotiators this can be achieved without exacerbating the existing hostilities. Depending on where these accusations lead to in future (and underscoring the need for ongoing monitoring and evaluation), the WTO dispute settlement process, and various investment treaty protections could become relevant, all extremely technical processes that would need the current level of harm to escalate.
(d) Other possible conflict remedies and strategies
The abovementioned strategies can be enhanced by correctly timed, and sequenced, media and other information campaigns. Produce a powerful 60-second video, with interview clips, stats, and thoroughly debunk the accusations. Run it in the US, on TikTok, apply to run it on Truth Social and publish the refusal, run it during US midterm elections, use it to create and escalate the costs of these accusations. There is no Streisand effect to fear here.
Start a webpage where the accusations are debunked on a weekly basis, create support for the page and link it to DIRCO statements, media releases and political events. Get the “victims” to join in on the debunking. Create permanent records and easily accessible graphs, short videos and statistics, and keep it updated monthly. South African senior politicians and diplomats should not ask, or expect, other world leaders to fight our battles for it, but a diplomatic and political environment should be created wherein the public siding with South Africa on these attacks become a politically desired outcome. The current global (and US) trajectories support the building of such consensus and enabling environment. Sitting on our hands, waiting for the storm to pass, will not.
Create the cost and the pressure, and make it clear to level-headed US thinkers and decision-makers that a cessation of the accusation, together with some form of apology, will make that cost and that pressure stop. Applying complex conflict principles to the challenge, we see that seemingly intractable conflicts need sustained application and a multi-directional approach. Pressure that does not exist now can, and should be, built up over time. Pressure and future vulnerabilities create opportunities not visible at this time. Conflict avoidance leads to perceptions of weakness and ineffective leadership. Compromise in the face of asymmetrical provocation is a terrible conflict strategy, creating new and more complex problems down the diplomatic, and national, road.
An assessment of these options, and a framework for a sustained response
Who would want to be in a situation like this? It is an exercise in absurdity, a conflict puzzle that I would, two years ago, have thought too fanciful to spend time on. And yet, here we are.
We’re not in Kansas anymore, and we need to adapt our conflict options and understanding to the situation as it is, not as we would want it to be. As discussed earlier, the temptation to simply look away and wait for a better administration or leader, is a strong one. It is, at some level, a valid approach, and it seems to me as if that is exactly what our government has decided to do. In ten years time we may have to look up the details of this absurd conflict. But is it the best option?
I do not believe so. I have set out some of my reasons above. The larger picture, far more urgent, far more important than this, finds South Africa trying to find its way in the brave new world, the world being shaped around us by China, the US and Russia. As a middle power, we need to be very careful in our decisions and our option selection. We need to upgrade our conflict management leadership skills to reflect the world of tomorrow, not of today or yesterday. That world no longer exists.
Being seen as a soft target, a country without conflict skills or options, will come with a heavy price tag in this future multipolar world. This should not be seen as an isolated insult, but an unintended test, of our abilities, of our resolve, and of our resilience in the face of seemingly impossible odds. I fear that the lesson of our grin-and-bear-it strategy may have sent the wrong subtle message already. The absence of strong repudiation of these attacks, whether the genocide accusation or the G20 side-lining, by some of our allies (the African Union in particular comes to mind) may be ascribed to self-interest, but also to a shrug by these would-be allies: if we do not stand up for ourselves in an effective and sustained way, why should they?
And this is maybe the biggest underlying part of what should be our conflict strategy, that track two option we mentioned earlier. The aggressive and very public, sustained use of the track one options we discussed above, not only with a view to their eventual success, but also the crucially important lesson that should run through those events like a golden thread: we will respond, there is a cost to the attacker, and an increasingly steep one at that. Several of the conventional conflict strategies are either not available to us (legal remedies), and others may seem to aggressive or too ineffectual seen in isolation.
Taken together, woven into a sustained symphony of well-timed and well-sequenced responses, I believe that such a strategy is a far better response than the current passive approach. These are mere examples of conflict strategies that can feature in a formal response.
There are several other strategies that could be added. A meticulous, detailed conflict map should be discussed and drawn, executed and updated on a regular basis. Such a plan should be so detailed as to make provision for possible future attacks, and responses to our strategies. That is how complex conflict is managed.
Conclusion
The slogan “We will not be bullied” has received popular traction in media reports of South African society’s responses to the various threats and insults coming our way from this administration. As we specifically cautioned ourselves earlier on in this discussion, an emotional swing at the attacker is not a good conflict response. Clint Eastwood would not have been a good, conflict competent diplomat.
But here in the new geopolitical arena, a variety of strands are being woven together at the same time, under tremendous pressure and complexity, and a wait-and-see approach, the passive non-committal strategies so beloved of our government in its national iteration, are by definition poor leadership and irresponsible conflict practices.
We have had more than enough time to absorb the shock of the initial attacks, we have had more than enough time to study and notice the various conflict relevant patterns and cycles coming from the current White House administrations, and we should by now be able to weave that into our larger geopolitical strategies. We may not be too late to do this, I hope, but the eleventh hour is here. This is not about genocide accusations only. This is about our place and standing, our options and our alliances in the new world, and how we respond to the conflicts are determining those options, and that future.
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading
1. My article on South Africa’s geopolitical conflict strategies can be accessed at https://www.conflict-conversations.co.za/conversations/walking-the-tightrope-the-south-africa-us-conflict
2. A study of South Africa’s place in the modern realism of geopolitics: https://www.conflict-conversations.co.za/conversations/trump-and-the-return-of-realism-how-south-africa-benefits
3. Relevant articles for our conflict work, can be found at www.conflict-conversations.co.za
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok
April 2026