Leading through conflict means believing in the possibility of what does not yet exist. It requires focusing on the luminous opportunity that lies at the end of the tunnel of obstacles.
Mark Gerzon
Introduction, and the general thesis of the article
The US / Israeli strikes on Iran on the 28th February 2026 have escalated, rather predictably, into a full-scale war, despite the Trump administration’s coy efforts at defining it as something less than a war. In the first six weeks of the war it has become apparent that this is not a regional conflict, with the world facing severe energy, supply chain and other economic crises, and the Middle East itself being set on fire by these decisions and retaliations.
I am writing this hours after the end of the Islamabad negotiations (on the 11th and 12th April 2026), with the predictable insults and threats resuming immediately after the conclusion of the talks. For purposes of our discussion here I do not join in the description of the talks as having failed, as experience in high stakes conflict negotiations will show that these processes often need a first round, a blowing off of steam, and a sizing up of each other. Parties often benefit from a failed first round, and there are certainly no structural obstacles to these talks resuming at some stage.
As complex conflicts in general, and this particular war, with these particular actors, has shown, we should not rely on rational decisions too much. Human conflict is first and foremost a story-driven experience, and rational justifications come afterwards, if at all. So while the full spectrum of the escalation of the war itself, a landed invasion, a US blockade of the Iranian blockade and five or six other options should still be seen as very much live options, I want us to assess what a negotiated settlement would look like in the foreseeable, short-term future.
This exercise presupposes that such a negotiated peace is the preferred option of the combatants, and if not a popular option, at least a generally accepted least-worst one. The reasons for the war, the legality or otherwise of it, and a range of other conflict questions all deserve their own focused assessment and discussion, and this article will, as far as possible, not take us down those byways. While there are of course a variety of conflict outcomes still on the table, this article focuses only on the question of the peaceful resolution of the war, and how that can be achieved. Our discussion need not accept that this is the best option, it simply analyses the scenario where such a peaceful resolution is deemed to be the optimal conflict outcome as seen from a general perspective.
While I believe that such a peaceful resolution is indeed the superior, even only feasible option, our discussion need not accept that premise. At the time of writing this, the US is threatening a naval blockade of the Iranian limitations set on the Strait of Hormuz, and an escalation of bombing and other interventions, including the conflict arenas of the Strait of Hormuz and Lebanon, are all remaining options. Whether this materializes or not need not affect our discussion, as we are assessing what peace should look like, whenever that opportunity arises. This discussion is obviously premised on operating conditions at this moment in time.
Is peace the best option?
We can briefly consider the point of departure of our discussion: the assumption that some or other peaceful resolution is the best solution. In broad terms, there are of course threats and arguments to continue with the war, to escalate the conflict, to turn it into a war of attrition, to put boots on the ground, and all of the conventional options. The loss of life, economic and political consequences for at the very least the attacking countries, and the shaky legal and moral foundations upon which the war is established must all militate against such escalation or prolonging of the war.
An escalation of conventional battlefield options can presumably be justified on the deemed failure of the Islamabad negotiations on the 11th and 12th April. Vice-president Vance has already, in his brief press statement at the conclusion of those talks, framed it as Iran refusing to accept the US “proposals”. But the Islamabad marathon has also shown, by implication, some understanding by everyone that negotiations and a peaceful resolution may be worth pursuing, that it may be a feasible option.
One assumes that all fantasies of quick military victories and “decapitations” have now been abandoned, and the viable alternatives to a rather urgent peaceful resolution become very speculative, costly and risky.
The rush to resolution
While I argue that the conditions for a mutually hurting stalemate (MHS) have been reached some weeks ago, and the parties certainly should try to build on these early stage negotiations, this is of course not necessarily the preferred case. Various threats, lists and demands are bandied about by the parties, and with the Iranian position we of course have a possible lack of clarity on authority and credibility as these messages are delivered from various sources.
While the Islamabad negotiations were presented as a unified front, I am not convinced that this carefully curated unity is the reality behind closed doors. This may be by design, or the simple result of the “decapitation” of its leadership structure earlier on. The Islamabad talks had its own run-up, with, in early April, for example, Iran informing the committee of mediators led by Pakistan that it is unwilling to meet with US officials, a statement that was denied and clarified, resulting in further “red line” preconditions and predictable posturing by all sides. In the same time period, Javad Zarif, a senior former Iranian diplomat, published a detailed list of proposals that could be acceptable to Iran in the Foreign Affairs magazine, a fascinating document that prefaced the very able and helpful mediation and negotiation guidance provided by Pakistan during the Islamabad talks.
Here we see a fascinating example of the conflict principle that a mutually hurting stalemate does not necessarily mean that conflict ripeness has been reached, alternatively that both those conditions have been reached, but that one or more of the combatants are not responding to those conditions, wisely or otherwise.
I would assume that most of us would be hoping for an end to this war, as soon as possible. As difficult as this may be, we should however caution ourselves against a rush to judgment, as this simply makes matters worse in the long run.
Conflict studies and a long list of actual conflicts show conclusively how damaging compromise can be in war, as understandable as the instinct towards such compromise may be. Compromise generally simply leads to an incomplete airing of conflict causes, resentment, polarization and today’s problems are simply paid forward to become tomorrow’s new and increased wars. Political pressures, news cycles and economic considerations all weigh heavily on decision makers to at least try to achieve something that can plausibly be packaged and sold as a victory, as some form of resolution.
A question to be borne in mind at this stage then is whether this war is ready for resolution at this stage, or whether some meaningful benefit would be achieved from escalation or a change in the nature of continued war. Before we can answer this, and a few other questions, in a responsible and practical manner, and in keeping with an avoidance of rushing the question of resolution, we need to pause to consider a few crucial and very much interlinked conflict concepts applicable to this war, and without which our assessment, and suggested solution, cannot be complete or accurate.
Face saving, and the influences of honor-based societies
All of the major participants in the war can be said to belong to a de facto honor-based society. Here, in simplified terms, the honor and prestige of the in-group are sacrosanct, far outweighing considerations of personal, individual interests. While the American society in general could be seen as more of an individualistic society, where the interests of the individual is paramount, I would argue that the Trump administration is an anomaly here, and that for practical purposes their decision-making units should be seen as an honor-based component.
Case studies and everyday experience show clearly how such societies are quite prepared to walk away from negotiations and agreements, and even to harm their own interests as opposed to accepting terms or treatment that are viewed, very subjectively of course, as being insulting or unacceptable to the prevailing in-group narratives. Add to this the volatile potential of deeply experienced religious and theological convictions (again, including certain members of the Trump administration and the influences on their decision-making), and we have powerful, emotional identity conflict drivers that can deeply affect, and derail, standard rational expectations and processes.
This unseen, but crucial conflict dynamic, must be understood and always factored into both the design of negotiated settlement proposals, and in assessing responses and counterproposals. What may seem to be a perfectly rational proposal may be experienced as deeply problematical, offensive or unacceptable based on these all-important and clearly emotional conflict drivers. With this in mind, we can start laying the foundation for a more conducive environment for that negotiated settlement by advising that, based on these realities, the institutional meme wars and offensive references to “bombing them back to the Stone Age” should be reconsidered, toned down or halted, at least pending resolution or the failure of such efforts.
The golden bridge
The conflict negotiation concept of the golden bridge is a well-developed one. In brief, it is a negotiation mechanism that allows one or more of the parties to accept the negotiated realities on the table, or even leave the battlefield on terms that it finds acceptable, and can sell to its main constituents. The popular term “off-ramp” is partially what is meant by this crucial concept. Here again, the case studies tell of a spontaneous willingness to scupper even good offers simply in order to avoid the real or perceived shame of accepting a dishonourable agreement.
Here we need to start factoring in the ever-present dynamics of Israel, its influence on US decision-makers, its own honor-based demands and expectations, and the effect its mere presence has on some of the other participants. It is tempting to argue, as so many do, that the golden bridge, the acceptable off-ramp, need not be structured for Israel and their demands, and that the US should simply put its foot down. I disagree with that, on grounds that would need its own article. The effect that a truly recalcitrant Israel could have on the US position, and on general stability in the region, including the war in Lebanon, must not be undervalued, and where possible the acceptable off-ramp considerations should try to include Israel, in separate discussions, and where necessary involving benefits that may not have direct bearing on the Iran war.
Interests away from the table
Our negotiated settlement will have to bear in mind the complex set of spoiler parties involved, or potentially involved in effective resolution here. Local countries and interest groups, the GCC union, opposing political parties, generational factional and tribal loyalties, ambitions of revenge and theological imperatives could snap the most reasonable settlement in two if left unattended.
This will require early, skilful and consistent 3-D negotiation in managing these actual and potential parties and constituents, and structuring settlement frameworks bearing in mind those interests and incompatibilities. Messaging here can be as fatal an error as substance, given the high degree of honor-based experiences and expectations.
Some groundwork for peace
The war itself is complex enough not to add unnecessary complications, and the parties must as far as possible guard against a home run approach, where all and every historical conflict and grievance get woven into the resolution. Less is more as far as complexity is concerned here, in order to start showing progress. One of the often forgotten or discarded modern lessons of complex conflict negotiation is that one should avoid, where possible, negotiating amidst chaos, especially chaos caused or controlled by your opponent.
Failing to do so, gives your opponent a lever to manage that chaos before you have sat down for negotiations, and in effect, it rewards negative conduct. A few ground rules should be agreed upon, or strongly suggested by the mediators (presumably again Pakistan), if negotiations should resume. Access to the Strait, respecting of the ceasefire by all parties and so on can increase the odds for clearer communication and successful resolution. The actual negotiation / mediation process itself of the 11th and 12th April seems to have gone as smoothly as can have been expected, with full credit to the Pakistani mediators.
In the days leading up to a resumption of negotiations, questions of sequencing and timing of the suggested solutions must be planned to excessive precision, as much depends on that in real world negotiations, and even solid plans often come apart because of a lack of such attention and precision.
Suggested strategy and resolution
What can such a negotiated settlement then look like in its final form? What type of end result can the parties be inspired to work towards? The possible permutations are of course endless, with small changes or late events having the potential to affect a myriad of other issues involved in the negotiations. But let us try to construct one such a possible framework for a negotiated settlement, simply to show the rationality of it, and that such resolution is possible.
Parties to complex and seemingly intractable conflicts are often so overwhelmed by the complexity, options and improbability of success that they become defensive, less creative or even give up the very idea of such resolution. Inspirational negotiation skills, clear conveying of options, and a clearly communicated problem-solving mind-set is necessary here. This exercise should be realistic. There will be no magic combination of proposals that will lead to an overall settlement of everyone’s problems. They will not live happily ever after because of this agreement.
What the parties should be aiming for is:
(a) a politically acceptable narrative, or a narrative that is capable of different interpretations;
(b) a big-picture framework that nails down the big issues, and leaves well-defined smaller points to be negotiated later, even by other participants, and with a clear distinction between political and technical issues;
(c) contingent agreements must be used, and consequences and benefits for good and bad conduct must be built into the negotiated agreement itself;
(d) a mechanism, such as renewed mediation or even arbitration, should be designed and agreed upon in order to deal with unanticipated new problems or developments, in such a way that such disagreements can be resolved speedily, without derailing the main process.
I would add some level of agreement as to public declarations by involved countries (X-posts, Lego movies and so on…) while negotiations are ongoing, but I accept that modern propaganda requirements may make that an impractical requirement.
Given the conflict dynamics we discussed above, and the past and recent history between the parties, trust should not be expected, waited for or made a requirement. There are other ways of ensuring, or increasing the probability of, compliance.
The essence of the negotiated agreement then, in our example, in no particular order:
1. The Strait of Hormuz: given the military results of the war, at this stage, there can be no realistic expectation of simply reverting to a pre-war world. Some form of joint access control between Iran and someone else, Oman and others, for example, should be negotiated. A time limit can be agreed upon. Once the concept is conceded, the specifics should fall into place relatively easily.
2. Nuclear sovereignty of Iran: again, once the realities of Iran pursuing legitimate nuclear ambitions should be recognized, and the basic agreement of the previous Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action should be revisited and rebuilt. The US and Israel should stop giving substance to the shadow and creating war in the present to try and avoid war in future. Monitoring and old-fashioned spycraft is what we have to safeguard our interests against hostile neighbours, and nuclear deterrence has its own craft and success that should be used.
3. War in Lebanon: regardless of the merits of the Israeli concerns about this aspect, none of these concerns, on Israel’s own version, are urgent and imminent enough to warrant the derailment of the larger war and its resolution. Unless some of these issues can be easily and quickly resolved as part of the larger negotiations (and we should remember that at this stage Lebanon is not even a party to the larger negotiations, and that they have indicated a willingness to enter into such negotiations with Israel directly), Israel should simply immediately cease such attacks and withdraw to the pre-war borders, with these parties living to fight or negotiate another day. These first three issues, I would suggest, form the minimum level of required settlement success.
4. Reparations: these demands are understandable, and they play a surprisingly important role in honor-based negotiations, but they can be achieved at a nominal level through concessions, tariffs and direct fees for passage through the Strait. Manage it with a light touch, and it need not hold the parties back. The mere restoration of a semblance of economic reality would in itself unlock several attractive options in this category. Complaints as to war crimes and atrocities can be referred to the relevant authorities dealing with such matters, such as the UN.
5. Guarantees against repeated or future attacks against Iran, or even by Iran: in modern geopolitical conflict these undertakings are essentially meaningless as actual safeguards, as we can see in many conflicts in Africa, for example. Add to that unpleasant reality the clear and marked shift to a brute form of realism in global politics, and the very concept of promises for such future conduct, under these circumstances, becomes a very tenuous one. If this remains a sticking point, understandably, I would recommend that we get as close to a meaningful guarantee by trying to get China, or Russia, or a combination of countries acting as such guarantors.
6. Sanctions against Iran: these need to be revisited under the circumstances, and some progress should be expected. I would anticipate that the war, and the US’s conduct towards some of their allies during the preceding 15 months, have made increased trade and collaboration between Iran and countries like China and Russia even more focused and urgent, and the sanctions in place need not act as a fatal obstacle.
7. Further than that, contractual and security minutiae should be left to involved parties to negotiate inter partes in their own time, giving effect to the rebuilding of regional relationships and systems, especially where such concerns are not realistically expected to upend the main negotiations. Even momentous but less urgent negotiation concerns, such as the safeguarding of the petrodollar and other energy concerns can be left off the agenda if immediate resolution is not forthcoming. Market forces can do the hard work there, in its own time.
Conclusion
If we accept that the negotiated settlement route is the best option, or that the parties will pursue it, we need to establish the environment we discussed earlier, and we will need a few early victories, clear examples of mutually beneficial benefits for all concerned. The cost of escalation of the war must be made to be dearer, more painful, than the cost of working towards, and accepting peace.
The region will probably always be a hotbed of hostility and instability, but maybe a dreadful war such as this one reminds the parties of the benefits of peace and stability. A negotiated settlement, an acknowledgement of economic and military realities, a reset of mechanisms and processes, and the achievement of some basic modus vivendi can lead to that great Middle Eastern prize: an uneasy but effectively managed peace.
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading
1. My article on negotiation in chaos can be accessed at https://www.conflict-conversations.co.za/conversations/conflict-management-in-a-lawless-environment-conflict-strategies-on-the-effective-application-of-power
2. Relevant articles for our conflict work, can be found at www.conflict-conversations.co.za
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok
April 2026