Essay 4 of 4
Patience in negotiation is strength, not weakness; it builds trust where force breeds suspicion
Zhou Enlai, comment during Sino-Soviet Border Talks (1969)
Chinese conflict systems and strategies: yang
In this, the concluding article in this series, we assess a selected few conflict strategies that can appropriately be viewed, for our purposes, as Chinese conflict strategies, specifically strategies and philosophies that are characteristic of conflict management as practiced by Chinese conflict practitioners, and where these strategies can be viewed as generally being examples where more Western conflict systems can take valuable lessons from.
Available lessons: the broad view
In my view, Western systems can benefit from revising some of their philosophical underpinnings to many conflict strategies and applying some of the approaches used by their Chinese counterparts. A first big step would be to afford conflict management (read ADR, mediation, conciliation, facilitation etc) a more central and respected place in human conflicts. While some trajectories may be showing a change in habits, the preferred Western way of conflict resolution is still litigation, with other forms of conflict management often having to apologetically seek a place at the table via enforced mediation, contractual requirements and so on.
This should not, this must not, be a patronizing acceptance of an alternative resolution strategy simply for the sake of it, it should follow upon an increase in conflict skills, so that these alternatives to litigation are seen as the primary, most beneficial options in the majority of commercial or personal conflicts. Here the Chinese impulse towards consensus building and group harmony, which includes the various levels of face-saving dynamics we studied earlier, provides a natural reliance on these alternatives to litigation, and it follows that these solutions are respected and actively supported in such conflicts. Litigation, with its destructive consequences as far as financial costs, delay and the harming of community and interpersonal relationships, is quite rightly seen as a limited option, an option that should be seen as a last resort, as an option that should be limited in its application in a variety of structural and community driven respects. I would also encourage a comprehensive debate about the extent of personal freedoms in the West, and what we can learn from Chinese conflict management in this important respect.
Freedom, as often understood and defended in the West is a precious treasure well-worth the cost of achieving and maintaining it, but recent years have seen a troubling increase in weighing this personal right as sometimes, at least in effect if not in conception, outweighing the common good. Unbounded personal freedom leads to entitlement and unreasonable expectations, to name but a few, which are all corrosive to the effective resolution of societal conflicts.
An endless cycle of resentment and unresolved conflict spirals serve no good purpose, and becomes an additional conflict cost that a society must pay. The Chinese balance between personal and community in matters of interpersonal or corporate conflict is in my view a more healthy and natural synthesis of interests.
Societal harmony, progress, a healthy respect for systems, institutions and processes can all be attained without giving up important and meaningful personal rights. I believe that the West is, in many visible respects, on the wrong side of this dividing line at the moment, often in the pursuit of avoiding or limiting societal conflicts, while in reality failing to resolve those conflicts, as well as creating quite a few new conflicts in the process. The wise limitation of personal and private rights have always been an inherent requirement of the balancing of interests, and conflict management works with this dynamic on an ongoing basis.
Available lessons: the narrower view
Earlier in this series, we reflected on the question whether face-saving dynamics in conflict management should be viewed as an asset or a liability in our assessment. I would argue here that it is not ultimately necessary to determine that question, and that a comprehensive knowledge of face-saving, its strengths and weaknesses will equip the conflict practitioner to effectively deal with modern conflict challenges involving this powerful phenomenon, and that a study of the Chinese experience is the ultimate in case studies on this topic.
Face dynamics in Chinese conflict practice can conveniently be divided into four main categories, with each category deserving of further study, and also being rather descriptive here on what that division contains. We have the category to (a) gain face (zheng mian zi), to (b) give face (gei mian zi), to (c) protect one’s own face (bao zi ji mian zi) and to (d) protect the face of the face of the partner. The value and importance of personal links and relationships we mentioned earlier are embodied in the rules, obligations and dynamics of the guanxi. Attempting to engage in conflict negotiations without an extensive knowledge of these principles and nuances is rather irresponsible, and doomed to failure. In my personal view, these systems and frameworks constitute a superior form of dealing with conflict negotiations where face dynamics are at play.
Conclusion
In debating the pros and cons with clients and friends we often bump up against perceptions and realities regarding the Chinese way of dealing with conflict. Some questions are difficult, or impossible, to truly answer with any authority. What value can we place on apparent Chinese satisfaction with their conflict systems? Is consensus being enforced, directly or indirectly? These questions deserve attention, and of course there would be limitations inherent in any comparison between the two broad systems. But, as I hope the series have illustrated, there remains value in comparing the core values and results of these two systems, and I believe that there are sufficient material of a relatively non-controversial nature that can help us have a realistic assessment.
The fact that there are these tremendous philosophical and political chasms between the generalised versions should be seen as support for such a comparison, and it can never in itself disqualify such a comparison. We cannot really explain Chinese conflict negotiation with reference to some forced analogy to a Western equivalent, symbol or parallel experience. The two systems are simply to radically different. The two should be studied separately, mastered separately, and then synergies and lessons can confidently be transposed and applied.
The Chinese negotiating mind-set is often a sophisticated blend of traditional culture, values, modern approaches to diplomacy and conflict negotiation praxis, and this practitioner works simultaneously on different levels, accessing the wisdom and guidance of a multi-level set of experiences and hard-won strategies. The popular Western impoverished “win at all cost” or “go in and make a profit” approaches cannot hope to stand a chance of ultimately doing well in such an environment.
At the risk of oversimplifying a very nuanced and sophisticated body of work, we can for purposes of our current investigation view the Chinese main responses to conflict as falling within one of four main categories, all of which provide us with rich lessons and opportunities for dialogue and mutual benefit. These categories can be summarized as (a) leave the conflict as it is (more nuanced than our conflict avoidance), (b) stop negotiating and move on to a fait accompli (traces of which we could see in some of the responses to President Trump’s tariff wars during mid-2025), (c) controlled escalation (popular in the economic environment), and (d) setting aside the conflict by pending or relinquishing the core sticking points and pursuing cooperation and exploration of other areas of possible benefit.
It is important to notice here that this strategy, this approach, often saves the parties from the more popular Western success or failure perceptions that so often lead to the end of negotiations and possible permanent harm to the involved relationships. A rich tradition, ever expanding and fed by case studies and practice in the trenches, aided by China’s expansion and increased power-plays in global politics and commerce, lead to Chinese conflict and negotiation practices being a formidable opponent or teacher, as the case may be.
This system is simply not a better or worse Western system. To compare is to ultimately misunderstand. An in-depth study of these systems will soon teach the student that we are dealing with two manifestly different systems and skillsets here. In addition to high levels of competency and development, Chinese conflict negotiations can also often be experienced as very robust, even predatory. They are not always constrained by the same values, laws and thought processes that say a Wall Street negotiator may suffer from. Even the ingrained dynamics of face simply do not mean, in practice, that one is dealing with a genteel opponent who is guaranteed to look after even the interests of his opponent. These often radically different views on loyalty, community, the individual, even time itself, makes Chinese conflict negotiation an absolutely fascinating field of study, and a necessary arena of practice and experience for the participant in these events.
With the advent of the multipolar world, and the inevitable increase in influence and reach enjoyed by China and its allies and business partners, it is indeed a very naïve strategy to continue to regard this aspect of modern elite conflict negotiation as an oddity or as a nice-to-have. It has become, and will continue to increasingly become, an indispensable part of the arsenal of the modern global elite conflict negotiator.
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading
1. The earlier articles in this series can all be found at inter alia The Conflict Conversations blog.
2. An excellent introductory volume is Guy Olivier Faure and I. William Zartman’s edited collection China’s Negotiating Mindset and Strategies (Routledge, 2025)
3. As a further introduction, and very eloquent guide to the early days of studying this rich field, I recommend The Fragile Bridge: conflict management in Chinese business by Andrew Hupert (published by ChinaSolved, 2012). Try to get the “professional edition”.
4. Relevant articles for your general negotiation and conflict work, and their source material, can be found at www.conflict-conversations.co.za
5. As a word of caution: this skill cannot be adequately transferred by study alone, and I fully recommend the appointment of a skilled coach for the final yards of this journey.
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok
October 2025