20 Nov
20Nov

You see, life is not always either/or; it’s not always black or white. Lots of grey areas. We’re all human beings trying to make sense of life, trying to figure out meaning, our essence.

Fred Khumalo


Memory is a weapon.

Don Mattera


Apartheid has fallen, see, we die right next to each other now, in intimate proximity. It’s just the living part that we still have to work out.

Damon Galgut


Two things are true at once

On 4 November, South Africans voted in a local election that redrew the country’s political map. Turnout reached 52%, six points up on 2021. The ANC fell to 30.8%, its lowest result since 1994 and nearly fifteen points down in five years. The DA rose to 24.6% and finished first in five of the eight metros, including all three in Gauteng. MK took eThekwini. Only Cape Town produced an outright majority. Everywhere else, the voters handed the final decision back to the parties. Unintended consequences, I’m sure, but here we are.


Over the past fortnight, the parties have been making that decision. As I write, an arrangement led by the ANC and ActionSA, with the EFF and MK alongside, looks set to govern Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni. Helen Zille, whose party won 35% in Johannesburg, fifteen points clear of the next party, has told her caucus to prepare for opposition. The details may still move. Herman Mashaba was still redrawing his red lines on Thursday, and the ANC’s NEC meets again tonight. 


But the shape of the settlement is clear enough to read. Expectations have been created and all but cemented, and walking any of this back in any meaningful way at this stage would be problematic, to put it mildly.


Two things are true at once, and the hardest discipline of this moment is to hold both of them. The machinery of our democracy held, again, under real strain. And the relationships that machinery exists to serve are fraying, in ways the coalition season has made unusually visible.I work on identity conflict for a living, and I love this country stubbornly, the way one loves a family member who keeps nearly getting it right. 


That is the spirit of what follows. I am not interested here in who won the negotiations. I am interested in what the past three weeks reveal about the deeper contest underneath them: what should worry us, what should encourage us, and what we could do better.


My argument is simple, and it is not comfortable for anyone. Every major actor in this coalition season played the identity game. Not one of them played it well.


Identity conflict is not identity politics

A distinction first, because our public conversation keeps blurring it. Identity politics is the ordinary, legitimate business of people organising around shared experience and shared interests. Every democracy has it. Our Constitution anticipates it. A party that speaks for workers, for a region or for a language community is doing nothing wrong.

Identity conflict is something else. It begins when group identity becomes the main lens through which threat, loyalty and legitimacy are judged. The question “who are they?” starts to outrank the question “what will they do?” The other group’s gain is felt as my loss, and soon as my danger. Leaders are rewarded less for delivery than for vigilance against the out-group. 


The scholarly literature has names for the symptoms: zero-sum framing, existential language, and what Rabushka and Shepsle called ethnic outbidding, where leaders compete to be the most faithful guardian of their own group.


Donald Horowitz described the end state as the “ethnic census” election: voting stops being a choice and becomes a declaration of belonging. Here is the first surprise of 2026. The voters did not behave like that. Fifteen points moved away from the ANC in five years. Votes flowed to the DA, to MK, to ActionSA, and in many directions at once. That is not a census. That is a citizenry making judgements, mostly about water, electricity, refuse and roads.The identity logic came back afterwards, in the negotiating rooms.


That is the pattern this article is about. In this coalition season, the electorate behaved more like a democracy than its political class did.


This is why I call South Africa a conflict laboratory. The question being tested here matters far beyond our borders. Can a deeply unequal, multiracial society, with living memories of racial domination, govern itself through fragmented multiparty democracy without its identity conflicts turning dangerous? We are running that experiment in real time, with real cities and real lives. The results so far are mixed. They are also instructive. If we are prepared to notice them, and learn from these clues.


Green flags

Let’s start with what went right, because it is easy to take for granted and it should not be.

The vote was credible and the losers accepted it: A former liberation movement took the worst result in its history. Its response was: “We accept it with humility.” Across our region, movements in that position have reached for other words, and other tools. Helen Zille’s concession was bitter but clean. There was no talk of a stolen election and no call to the streets. We should not let familiarity make this ordinary. It is the single most important asset a divided society can have: losers who still believe the system is theirs. Fighting back in different ways, using the coalition chaos building blocks to your advantage does not reflect badly on democracy itself.

The electorate is fluid: In a society where identity conflict runs deep, the healthiest sign is votes that move. Ours moved, hugely, and largely in response to performance. Identity is not destiny for South African voters. That is the strongest finding of 2026, and every party should take it seriously.

People kept talking across lines: The IFP met the DA, the ANC, the EFF, MK, ActionSA, the Freedom Front Plus and others, and reported broad agreement on governance principles. The ANC and the DA formally opened talks on 15 November despite resistance inside the ANC. Talks that fail are still talks. Habits of contact are built this way, one awkward meeting at a time.

The language of delivery has taken to the stage: ActionSA’s line during counting was that local government is not ideological: “It’s about electricity, water, roads, sewage and refuse.” Its own conduct since has been highly tactical, and I will come to that, but as a statement of principle it is exactly right, and the fact that parties now feel they must say it is a gain.

Fragmentation is also pluralism: No party can now govern most of our cities alone. That is frustrating and often chaotic. It is also the condition that forces bargaining, and bargaining across difference is what divided societies most need to learn. We have done it before. The negotiators of the early 1990s invented the doctrine of “sufficient consensus” for exactly this kind of problem.None of these are achievements to bank. They are habits to protect, and each of them was under pressure in the past three weeks. Green flags, seeds if you will, to notice and grow.


Red flags

(1) Coalitions built against, not for

The defining phrase of this season came from inside the ANC. A senior leader reportedly described the Gauteng strategy as “ABZ”: Anything But Zille. The party was prepared to make major concessions to ActionSA, including the mayoralties of Johannesburg and Tshwane, rather than risk a DA-led administration. As a negotiating tactic, this is understandable. As a sign of where we are, it should worry us. 

A coalition defined by whom it excludes is a negative coalition. Research on polarized democracies finds that negative partisanship, dislike of the other side, now predicts political behaviour more strongly than attachment to one’s own side. Coalitions glued together by shared aversion have a structural weakness. They have no common programme to fall back on once the threat has passed. The case studies are clear. Johannesburg has had seven mayors since 2021. That is what governance looks like when the glue is opposition rather than purpose. 


The better option would be to work with those we do not trust and like, especially with those. The proposed bloc brings together parties that disagree about a great deal, including, at times, about each other. It may hold. I hope it does, because the residents of these cities cannot afford another round of collapse. But it is starting life with the weakest possible foundation: agreement about who should not govern. 

Fairness requires saying that this habit is not one party’s. In 2024, the DA campaigned against what it called a “Doomsday Coalition” of its rivals, warning that it would plunge the country into ethnic and racial conflict. This year its posters warned voters against “coalition chaos”. That is also mobilisation through fear of the other. The DA is now on the receiving end of a logic it has itself used.


There is a deeper identity-conflict dynamic here. When a person becomes a symbol, compromise becomes betrayal. I have written about this for years. Helen Zille is no longer simply a candidate in these negotiations. For her supporters she stands for competence and refusal to be bullied. For many of her opponents she stands for something far older and more painful. Once a negotiation is about what a person symbolizes, the room for practical bargaining shrinks to almost nothing.


(2) Vetoes on persons, and two stories of legitimacy

Within days of the results, ActionSA’s offer to the DA was reported to be simple: Johannesburg and Ekurhuleni for the DA, on one condition. Helen Zille (and Brink) must go. The DA’s answer was its own rule, that the largest party chooses the mayor. Geordin Hill-Lewis refused to sacrifice her, and dismissed speculation about a swap.Anyone trained in negotiation will recognise what happened next. Both sides converted a negotiation about governing into a contest of positions about a person. 

Fisher and Ury’s oldest lesson is that positions lock and interests bargain. What were the interests underneath? ActionSA wanted to keep Tshwane, to stay relevant and to avoid being seen by its voters as the DA’s junior partner. Losing the de facto throne in Tshwane also hurt at several levels. The DA wanted to protect its credibility, its rules and its refusal to be dictated to. Those interests were not irreconcilable. Formulas exist, from a different nominee to a programme-first agreement with offices settled last. None was found. 

One can respect the DA’s loyalty to its candidate and still ask, honestly, what that loyalty cost Johannesburg’s residents.


The outcome produces a second, quieter danger. In Johannesburg the DA won 35%, the ANC 20% and ActionSA 16%. Two stories are already forming. One says: “We won clearly, and they shut us out.” The other says: “A majority of the council chose otherwise, as the law allows.” Both are true. That is precisely the problem.

Vamik Volkan wrote about “chosen traumas”, the stories through which a group remembers its injuries and explains the present. Legal processes can still feed them. For many DA voters, this month risks confirming a belief that the system will never let them govern, however they vote. For many of the DA’s opponents, the alternative outcome would have confirmed a different fear about who the DA really serves. Each community walks away with its story strengthened. Identity conflict on stilts.

This is how identity conflicts deepen inside fully lawful democracies. Nothing illegal happens. Legitimate processes simply produce a growing sense of illegitimacy on one side or the other. Our institutions can count votes superbly. They are much less equipped to manage what people feel about the count.


(3) Everyone played the identity game

The temptation in analysis is to pick a villain. The honest picture is that nearly every actor reached for identity in the past three weeks, each in its own way. 

A few examples:

The call for “Black parties” to unite: 

In the days after the vote, voices in and around the ANC, the EFF and MK spoke of coalitions among “Black parties”. The writer Malaika Mahlatsi called this vulgar opportunism, and she was right to name it. Using race as a coalition criterion is the ethnic census returning at elite level. It overrides what voters actually did, which was to move across lines. It also abandons the non-racial tradition that the ANC, of all parties, claims as its inheritance.

Proximity as contamination: 

Julius Malema blamed the EFF’s losses on the ANC’s decision to govern with the DA in the GNU, arguing that it had made the DA more acceptable. Read through a conflict lens, that is a striking claim. It treats cooperation across the old divide as the problem itself, rather than as the thing a divided society most needs.

Regional and ethnic consolidation: 

MK’s dominance in eThekwini draws heavily on loyalty to Jacob Zuma and on a regional identity. It is a legitimate democratic result. It is also a reminder that our fault lines are not only racial, and that new identity cleavages can open even as old ones shift.

ActionSA’s tactical identity: 

ActionSA has positioned itself as a home for voters, many of them Black and urban, who are leaving the ANC but do not see themselves in the DA. That is a real constituency with a real grievance. But its veto on Zille, and its readiness to swing between blocs, suggests a party that uses identity as leverage rather than as a commitment.

The DA’s identity errors:  

The DA treats identity as noise to be drowned out by governance metrics. Its argument is: look at Cape Town, look at Tshwane, judge us on delivery. In a society shaped by identity conflict, that argument arrives too late. People first ask “are you for people like me?” and only then “can you deliver?” 

Choosing Helen Zille for Johannesburg was a statement on the first question. She is formidable and experienced. She is also, for many Black South Africans, still associated with her 2017 remarks about colonialism and a range of other real and imagined offences. Whatever one thinks of those remarks, the choice told persuadable partners and voters that the party does not hear what it is asking them to overlook. 

The DA’s coalition principles name “non-racialism”. But non-racialism declared is not non-racialism experienced. The DA believes it lost Gauteng on numbers and personalities. It also lost on meaning. These are serious, intelligent leaders, many of them shaped by our own extraordinary negotiated transition. They know better. 

Yet the dominant instinct of this season was to use identity as a weapon, a shield or a bargaining chip, rather than to treat it as the terrain everyone must learn to govern.


Lessons from the laboratory: better practice

What would better practice look like, concretely, from here?

  1. Programme before posts

Coalitions should agree on a written programme first and allocate offices last, and they should publish the agreement. A coalition that can say what it is for is harder to collapse, and easier for residents to hold to account. Negotiations behind closed doors have left voters guessing at what their cities have been promised.

  1. Rules agreed before the fight, not during it

Much of this month’s bitterness came from disputes over principles that should have been settled long before an election, such as who nominates a mayor. Durable national rules for forming and running coalitions would take some of the heat out of each new round. We still do not have them, and every hung council pays the price.

  1. Give the excluded a real stake

The largest party in Johannesburg, Tshwane and Ekurhuleni is heading for opposition. The new governments can blunt the “we were shut out” story by giving opposition real roles: chairing oversight committees, a seat in budget consultation, and genuine engagement with wards that voted for others. Arend Lijphart and Donald Horowitz disagreed about much, but both understood this. Losers must keep a stake in the system or they stop believing in it.

  1. Treat language as a public good

Leaders should stop framing coalition choices in racial or existential terms. A short public code of conduct, signed across parties, committing to no racial bloc rhetoric and no doomsday framing, would cost nothing and signal a great deal.

  1. Govern for those who voted against you

The bloc now taking power in Gauteng has a chance to prove “Anything But Zille” wrong in the only way that counts: by delivering, visibly, in areas that voted DA. Nothing would do more to defuse the grievance now forming.

  1. The DA must learn identity-conflict literacy

That means acknowledgement before argument. Herbert Kelman’s work on intractable conflicts found that mutual acknowledgement of the other’s identity and pain is a precondition for movement. The DA’s opportunity lies in choosing candidates, partners and words that signal belonging, not only competence. Its governance record is real. Until the party learns to speak to who people are, that record will keep being judged through a lens it refuses to see. If they stay with the tools they have they have reached the general periphery of their national growth.

  1. Hold everyone to the same standard

Media, civil society and analysts like me should apply one test to every party: did your conduct widen or narrow the circle of people who feel this democracy belongs to them? We have done harder things than this. In 1991, South Africans from across the divide sat together in the Mont Fleur scenario exercise and imagined futures they could share. A few years later, negotiators who distrusted one another built a constitution around the idea of sufficient consensus. Those were the tools of a country that understood it was in an identity conflict, at least at an instinctive level, and chose to govern it rather than weaponize it.


Where we are

So where are we, as a nation, at the end of November 2026? We are a democracy whose machinery works. People voted in growing numbers, the counts were trusted, and a once-dominant movement accepted its worst defeat with grace. We are an electorate that moves, judges and punishes, and that refuses, in its majority, to vote as a census. Those are not small things. Many countries would envy them.We are also a country whose political class, under pressure, kept falling back on the oldest script we have. This is as often as not derived from pure uninspired ignorance as it is from malice. 

Coalitions were formed against people rather than for programmes. Race was openly offered as a reason to govern together. A party that won the most votes in our economic heartland is heading for opposition, convinced it was wronged, and largely unable to see its own part in that. Its rivals are celebrating a victory built on the narrowest possible foundation. 


Each side has left these weeks with its story of grievance a little stronger. The danger is not collapse. Our institutions are sturdier than our cynics believe. The danger is erosion: a slow drift in which elections remain free and fair, but more and more citizens come to feel the system is not quite theirs. 

That drift is how identity conflicts harden in democracies that never formally break. The remedy is not to wish identity away. South Africans will always carry their histories into the voting booth and into the negotiating room. The remedy is to govern identity skillfully: to name it honestly, to acknowledge each other’s fears, and to build coalitions around what we want to achieve together. We taught the world once that this could be done. The laboratory is still open. The question for every leader who spent these three weeks counting seats is whether they will remember what the experiment is for.


RESOURCES AND SUGGESTED READING

Full references, further reading material, courses, coaching, study material, workshops / seminars, mediation and representation are available on request.

Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.

(c) Andre Vlok

November 2026

Comments
* The email will not be published on the website.