Scope of the essay
When Lt. General Nhlanhla Mkhwanazi held his unexpected press conference at the SAPS Provincial Headquarters in Durban on Sunday, the 5th July 2025, he lit the short fuse to another South African polycrisis, born out of the perpetual inability, or unwillingness, of our political leaders to effectively deal with our unresolved complex conflicts.
Allegations of political interference, the involvement of drug cartels in our security system, and a few choice allegations directed at no less than our Minister of Police, Senzo Mchunu, now lie on the table before our president to deal with. On Sunday the 13th July, one week after the Mkhwanazi allegations, president Ramaphosa held his own press conference.
With this event as a point of reference in this conflict, we should take stock of a few important aspects thereof. What should be done specifically from a conflict management perspective? What tools and strategies do modern conflict studies and practice make available to our president and his government? How can those strategies be used to benefit the South African nation? I think it is helpful to consider our present position through three critical focal points, three lenses, that may help us form an informed opinion of what is being done:
(a) a critical examination of the president’s press conference and suggested plan of action,
(b) comparing that actual plan to strategies and tools available from modern conflict management that should have been utilised, or which should be included in future applications of dealing with the conflict, and
(c) a brief look at comparative situations in global politics and conflicts.
(a) The actual plan of action
As far as the important optics and secondary dynamics of dealing with this conflict are concerned, I would suggest that dealing with a crisis of this magnitude a week after the triggering event is too slow. The president’s travel commitments, consulting with various parties and other preparatory work do not amount to convincing reasons for the length of the delay. As the country also saw in the days leading up to the Sunday press conference, the president had time for other, less urgent matters.
Several other opportunities at public assurance and good conflict communication were also left by the wayside, such as having Mkhwanazi and Mchunu present during the address, allowing unscripted questions from the media and so on.
Tentative, hesitant leadership, especially in our current political environment, gives rise to speculation, uncertainty and increased polarization, amongst other preventable conflict complications. Here the simple truth of public conflicts, if applied skilfully, would have seen the president attending to an initial and earlier public appearance, clearly showing areas where information is being gathered, but calming the waters, and showing presence, confidence and competence. Again, as we have become accustomed to, the press conference was riddled with catchphrases and clichés, all showing more of the same tired, outdated thinking that brought the nation here in the first place.
Assurances of work being done on these problems do not deal with the abundantly clear impression that the president was caught stone cold unaware of much of these developments as seen through the eyes of Lt. Genl. Mkhwanazi, and the manner in which the first press conference was held further destroys the effort at showing that progress was being made.
Again, frustratingly, the president failed to show confidence, in himself and in the unfolding process, by not allowing sincere and tough questions from the media. The pre-packaged nature of the delivered speech, coming at the end of a week of speculation, simply adds more questions than answers. Predictably, the correct balancing of the rule of law and audi alteram partem, joined to a healthy and constructive differentiation and information gathering exercise, have been confused with urgency and effective interim measures and conflict communication management.
Reasonable people would want the accurate and complete truth to emerge, that is an important part of effective conflict management, the rule of law and good governance. Very few of us are demanding mob justice, but the additional conflict dynamics of this urgent national crisis should be apparent, regardless of the truth of Mkhwanazi’s allegations.
There is so much that can be done by competent leadership while that process takes its course, there are so many different timeframes that the various remedies can be allocated to. In the positive column, the address did suspend Mchunu, and appoint a commission with certain expedited powers of recommendation (not decision-making) as to the employment status of individuals being investigated. The suspension of Mchunu is a solid and commendable step in the right direction. The absence of meaningful and specified multi-party access, oversight or input however detract from those small gains, and if we notice that interim reports from the commission are expected three and six months after commencement, it is clear that we are in Zondo commission territory again.
Of course, poor or insufficient conflict communication does not preclude a leader from being effective in resolving or managing those conflicts. May it be our worst concern that we have political leaders that are effective, but simply poorly communicate their intentions. But what precedent do we have with this president, this government, in the decisive, effective management of our complex conflicts? What do we base any remaining hope in the effective management of this crucial stage in our history on? Partisanship? Identity dynamics? At what stage does unwarranted hope become a conflict liability?
The appointment of these committees and Mchunu’s leave of absence can, in isolation, be accepted, but these are, at best, incomplete and ponderous strategies. Have committees and commissions if we must, but these should be second or third stage strategies, build around entirely different goals and timeframes than what the more urgent work demands here.
Modern complex conflicts require a deft management and an advanced understanding of different timeframes, sequence and timing considerations, and using the apparent chaos to further the conflict goals themselves. Better and earlier conflict communication skills, multi-party access and collaboration, greater operational detail of the affected departments and people (including the military), a much shorter timeframe and mechanisms of transparency and integrity, as rather obvious remedies, would have gone a lot further in restoring hope and confidence than the president’s perfunctory delivery.
This was also a golden opportunity for the president to seize control of the narrative of this conflict, as a foundational conflict requirement. This was not done, and the competing narratives will continue to bedevil immediate conflict challenges.
These considerations remain valid even when we accept that the president’s choices and decisions here are constrained and complicated by the storms blowing through the ANC at the moment. But it is both ineffective and dishonest conflict management, especially in a senior political leader, to try and balance incomparable interests to the prejudice of a nation. Personal and partisan interests and agendas can only be accommodated at this late stage if they are compatible with, and can be made subservient to, national interests.
Complex conflicts have the effect of forcing hard decisions, and a range of hard decisions that would have been of benefit to the nation have not been dealt with, at least at this stage.
At best, the president’s address was a minimum-level strategy, leaving many immediate conflict benefits behind. We hope that these benefits and conflict outcomes are then future goals, and that these areas of dynamic conflict management will be constantly held in the mind of all of those who work on this.
(b) The plan that could have been
It is important, from a conflict management perspective, to remember that national, complex conflicts that are not either resolved or managed by government, over the years become spirals of conflict that start to create their own secondary conflicts and complications. South Africans have been subjected to decades of unresolved, poorly managed national conflicts, all grafted on top of significant unresolved conflicts from our pre-democratic era. South African citizens must therefore not just deal with a stagnant economy, scandalous levels of corruption, unemployment and inequality, rampant crime and political uncertainty, but also with the bitter fruit of these mismanaged conflict cycles manifesting in increased polarization, increased radicalism, conflict rigidity towards people and processes, distrust and a long list of other preventable conflict errors. It is against this backdrop that president Ramaphosa approaches this latest polycrisis.
Had he, and a succession of earlier political leaders, been more effective in gradually making progress with the national conflicts (instead of making them worse), this latest iteration of our political dysfunction would have been received with a somewhat more positive, hopeful frame of mind, as opposed to a general sense that this is another example of flagrant mismanagement, serial criminal conduct that flourish with any consequence, of a system that is broken beyond repair. Any strategy to deal with this latest crisis, even a potentially good one, is therefor at a disadvantage right from the first step.
All of these mismanaged conflict consequences add to an already complex situation, cumulatively adding straws to the proverbial camel’s back. This environment, created by poor conflict knowledge, outdated conflict strategies and generally ineffective leadership, also of course creates in itself opportunities for radical, harmful alternative theories and “solutions” to be received with more sympathy. To a group that believes that democracy is not working, that they are not being heard, that they are repeatedly disrespected and that the conventional system does not provide for their aspirations, any alternative starts to look more and more plausible. When even our systems of law and order appear lawless, good order and conflict management become even more difficult than normal.
South Africa is furthermore a nation where the majority of communities practically require face-saving rituals and protocols to be respected and applied, but the government, in either losing sight of this, or being unable to manage this requirement while over-emphasizing the requirement of consensus-seeking, has again added layers of complexity and unnecessary complication, especially in the security industry, a field of conflict with its own well-established insecurities and risks. An honour-based society also requires a consistent display of effective power. This power is seen, over time, in the application of that power in negotiations, in delivering basic needs and prosperity, in being trustworthy and being worthy of being granted that power, again especially in the security field.
As much as the dynamics of identity conflicts shield this government from much of its conflict mismanagement and poor leadership, those same dynamics can, when it reaches the end of its tether, ensure that public mismanaged conflicts end its reign. These conflict considerations are even more apparent and even more sensitive when dealing with matters of national security. Identity conflicts require a modern and highly-skilled understanding and application of those levers in modern national conflicts, and this government has repeatedly failed to show the most rudimentary working knowledge of how to use those conflict dynamics in the best interests of the country. In-group versus out-group conflict realities can be a springboard towards the transformation, resolution or at least effective management of the Mkhwanazi-crisis and our larger national conflicts, or it can exacerbate those same problems.
A succession of South African governments have also shown the nation that they are completely ill-prepared for modern internal conflict. We have no example of a political leader being able to not just welcome the inevitable conflict chaos of the modern world, but to harvest benefit and prosperity from such chaos. Our chaos, so often self-inflicted, drags us deeper down into the swamps of mismanagement and conflict incompetence.
Chaos, in modern conflict theory and praxis, has become an asset to conflict management, if, and only if, the involved leaders know how to reap those whirlwinds. Complex conflicts, interlinked with so many other conflicts and complicating factors, should be strategized and resolved more by way of nudges and incremental successes than home-run approaches, and this modern approach also shows nothing in the success column as far as this president is concerned.
Small successes change the conflict confidence and very mood of a nation, making the next difficult step, the next success, so much easier, showing the exact opposite of the despair cycles we mentioned earlier. Where are the small, incremental successes in any of these conflicts? The sheer enormity of the Mkhwanazi allegations largely stem from an absence of earlier effective conflict management, and they would arguably have not been necessary in the first place had these various conflicts been managed competently.
Several other modern conflict concepts and strategies also remain apparently unknown to our political leadership. The value and strategic benefit of the sequence and timing of conflict interventions, the limitations and damage done by compromise as a conflict strategy, and a box full of modern conflict strategies that remain untried in the South African environment serve to remind us that most of our political leaders’ conflict skills development ended decades ago in their activist and union negotiation phases.
But it is unfortunately not just in the absence of modern effective conflict strategies that we need to assess our president’s response, but also in the apparent strategies that he and his government have shared with us. Our leaders’ obsession with committees and commissions shows either an enormous conflict incompetency, or a more sinister strategy to obfuscate and only survive the current news cycle. I am not sure which one is the worst option for the South African public. At some stage consensus-seeking becomes an unwarranted brake on conflict progress, and when a nation well-versed in the value of consensus-seeking and dialogue urges a government to turn talking into urgent action you know that you have overused the consensus excuse.
Consensus and compromise are valuable conflict tools, but they have limitations as far as content, timing and sequence are concerned, beyond which they become liabilities.
(c) Other plans
Outside any academic or specialized treatment of these conflicts, we see several visible examples of how these available strategies and modern skills can, and should be used in comparative global conflicts.
President Obama often stood in front of a crowd, sometimes in informal dress, talking to them, inspiring them, taking them into his confidence, assuring them that what appears to be a crisis is being dealt with effectively. This is a very visible, very real example of the conflict best practices dealing with that slight difference between public perception and actual effective resolution. It is not just good enough to fix the problem in time, modern audiences demand, and deserve, to be taken along on that journey. The fact that the subject matter here, in our current problem, is state security does not detract from the effective management of public anxieties and concerns, in fact it emphasizes the requirement. It is a simple conflict reality that a society, especially one as deeply polarized as our own, will start speculating and creating perceived answers and solutions into any lacunae left by poor conflict management by its government.
Vladimir Zelensky has shown the value of a leader that steps right into the conflicts affecting his nation, being visible, being proactive, inspiring people even in their darkest days. A bit further back in history, we find a figure like Winston Churchill, walking through the rubble of bombed London, inspiring his people with handshakes, inspirational speeches and personal presence to continue believing that success and better days will come.
Of course, personal presence and good communication skills in political leaders only go so far, and they have to be backed by success and effective conflict management as far as the merits of those conflicts are concerned, but it buys leaders a bit of time, and it reduces the secondary conflict damage that we looked at earlier.
Conclusion
A skillful, conflict competent national leader would not have allowed matters to get to this unstable state. That having nevertheless occurred, a skillful and conflict competent national leader will welcome the unique opportunities presented by this conflict, opportunities to drag so many of our national problems out into the sunlight, opportunities to once and for all clean house in the full glare of public scrutiny and transparency.
Effective conflict leadership here can restore a lot of public confidence, or at least give this government a bit more time to become the leadership that this country needs. It can start to restore the ANC’s battered public image, and provide tangible, real-world evidence of leaders that are competent and who care for the nation. It can certainly be a wonderful opportunity in the one-upmanship that we have been subjected to in the government of national unity.
It can convince the South African public that our conflicts are platforms for progress, not causes for our continued underperformance and enforced mediocrity. President’s Ramaphosa’s speech of the 13th July has ticked some of the predictable boxes, but overall it has displayed further evidence of a leadership without modern conflict skills, without an effective roadmap to improvement and success, and a political leadership that simply are not sufficiently skilled to optimally deal with our national challenges.
The predictable spirals of our unresolved, destructive national conflicts continue to turn, trapping us all in unnecessary conflict outcomes. The fact of a truly successful South Africa, a nation that at last reached its full potential, remains achievable, I believe. The journey and its map are not all that obscured. Conflict should transform, heal, rebuild, be the first step towards prosperity and success. Conflict avoidance and mismanagement creates new conflict causes and triggers. It can be a liberating energy or a destructive storm. It does not have to be this way.
(Note: I will expand on some of these points, and further developments, as this conflict develops).
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading 1. Relevant articles for your general negotiation and conflict work, and their source material, can be found at www.conflict-conversations.co.za
2. For an expanded argument on how our political leadership should heal the country by healing the conflict in our cities, see Skylines: the modern urban conflict manual, by Andre Vlok (Paradigm Media, 2025), available via Amazon or the publishers.
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok
July 2025