Ambiguity, as we stated earlier, is considered a positive in China.
Andrew Hupert
A brief explanation of the focus of the rest of the series
Having briefly explored the foundational philosophies and institutions of modern Chinese conflict management, I want to divide the remaining two articles in this series into (a) a discussion of the arguable weak spots in the Chinese system, where Western practitioners should approach strategies and comparisons with some caution, and (b) the converse, a focused look at some of the best aspects of the Chinese system, where Western practitioners can learn and gain from Chinese strategies and tactics.
In this specific article then, we take a look at potential difficulties that Western conflict systems may experience with their Chinese counterparts, or where an additional degree of caution and nuanced understanding in the application of such strategies are required. I do not intend being simplistic in this division, and I ask the reader to hold the distinction lightly.
“Weaknesses” here may very well be viewed as particular strengths by Chinese practitioners, for example, and the classification is intended to be of a pedagogical nature only, not as criticism of these techniques and philosophies. A clearer way of understanding the distinction may be to view these examples as instances where Western practitioners or business people may hold different views on these strategies, or where they may be surprised if they encounter such events. Judgment of these strategies is rather irrelevant, knowledge and being forewarned about them, and accurately and comprehensively integrating them into your own strategies, that is the aim of these distinctions.
Chinese conflict strategies: yin
A crucial and seemingly obvious difference in the two systems may be simply the way that the two approaches value and apply individual versus group interests. A suggestion, in a Western setting, that an individual should relinquish her rights for the benefit of the group (say the employer, for instance), would be met with derision, and be regarded as naïve, or even abusive. In traditional Chinese approaches to that same dispute, that paramountcy of the group / communal interests would be unspoken and accepted without much dissension.
This creates an important default setting for the two respective systems, one that must form an early and important part of strategizing. It may also skew statistics and related experience with Chinese conflict systems, simply because the operating assumptions and rules of engagement are so radically different. From a group-centred approach to conflict resolution flows a myriad of other conflict consequences. Face saving is a very different phenomenon, considerations and the consequences of procedural fairness (real or perceived) must be treated differently, solutions may be very different from individualized societies and their conflict resolution paradigms, and even the question and content of sanction in conflict can be a very different conflict challenge.
As a practical example, a Chinese conflict party may be viewed as having an actual legal and moral duty to restore harmony to a particular community, and conflict resolution processes and options may revolve around this presupposition, a factor that in all probability is instinctively accepted by such party or parties. Western individual-focused conflict systems often balk at the very idea that an individual carries such a duty, and this is not to be confused with the Western concept of restitution, a concept which is often begrudgingly accepted or made part of Western conflict systems.
When we study and integrate the crucial conflict concept of face saving we encounter a particular paradox in Chinese commercial negotiation and conflict strategies. Face saving, to your Chinese counterparts, is crucial, important to the point of destroying a potential deal if mismanaged – but it may also often, during your negotiations, come across as if these counterparts do not particularly care about your opinion about their conduct.
Remember that face saving has an in-group and out-groups. You cannot prepare for specific events in this category, you have to understand and integrate the entire conflict concept so that you can move with events, so that chaos becomes a vehicle to success, not a mistake that you need to rectify. The conflict concept of differentiation, ie where parties air their grievances and where more accurate information is exchanged in order to clarify possible misunderstandings or grounds for agreement should also be seen as exhibiting important differences in Chinese conflict work.
In traditional Chinese communities certain levels of information, especially involving family groups, may be viewed as outweighing the interests of individual conflicts, and enquiring about such matters may in itself be seen as offensive. This has implications for the follow-up phase, where such gathered information is synthesized into a new solution to the conflict. Communication is crucially important in business negotiation and conflict, and here lies another hidden minefield for the unwary participant.
Confucian precision and face saving communication, in the Chinese approach, is not always done through words, and an above-average knowledge on nonverbal communication, as adapted to their paradigms, becomes essential. Negative reception of an idea, dissent or even outright criticism may not be expressed with the bluntness and verbal clarity that Western communicators are accustomed to, while the nonverbal communication has been telling you exactly that for hours. The fact that no one disagrees verbally with your arguments around the table most certainly does not mean necessarily that you have convinced them.
All of this weighs the Chinese approach to conflict towards what Western systems would see as compromise. The fact that such compromise often has slightly different nuances and considerations than the conflict compromise known in Western systems is of little consequence in practice. Western conflict systems have in recent years produced important work showing the negative implications of compromise in conflict, especially where compromise is applied as a strategy in itself. Negative conflict outcomes such as resentment, conflict avoidance, cyclical conflict and conflict rigidity can follow on the unskilled application of compromise as conflict solution, and Chinese systems are heavily favoured towards such outcomes, whether this is by way of cultural precedent or state preference.
It is of course to be noticed that many of the negatives experienced from compromise in a Western conflict system, such as resentment, a lack of a sense of closure, cyclical conflicts and skepticism may simply never arise in a society where compromise is seen in a much different, more positive, nearly compelling light. This sharp divide should nevertheless be carefully woven into conflict strategies involving a mixture of expectations and conflict goals, such as for instance a Western / Chinese commercial negotiation.
The modern Chinese state intervention in a variety of commercial and personal conflicts also, in practice, run the risk of rushing conflicts towards resolution, before they have reached conflict ripeness, or without the formality of some of these processes allowing for a proper differentiation phase. This more focused intervention by state systems may also create a subtle sense of being forced into certain modes of conduct during these conflict, or into resolutions that the parties may not have crafted for themselves had it not been for such state participation. This can have an adverse effect on conflict resolution in general, from parties being conflict avoidant to process and outcome efficiencies and unintended outcomes.
The dynamics between community-based focus and the various state policies also mean that, over time, the Chinese approach to valued relationships in business or in conflict is often a very utilitarian one, where the value of that relationship is dependent upon the benefits that can be derived from it. We may argue that this is equally so in Western calculations, but in my view the Chinese approach is a more focused and deliberate one, and that it should be factored in to conflict and business calculations. The same goes for attitudes towards the concepts of ownership, intellectual property and profit. Here these important differences in the very definitions of concepts like fairness and ethics often lead to immense and commercially fatal misunderstandings.
Conclusion
These selected examples of what may be viewed as aspects of Chinese conflict management that Western or other non-Chinese practitioners of business people should be aware of. We have already noticed instances of potentially meaningful differences of opinion, and of the commercial decisions and conflict responses that stem from worldviews. So often Western businesspersons make the fatal mistake of basing their negotiation strategies on their perception of what is “rational;” and “self-evident”. My own experience tends to lean towards an approach where we are dealing more with conflict management than conflict resolution, in most of these instances, and there is of course great value in recognizing that reality before it becomes too late to reverse harm done.
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading 1. The earlier articles in this series can all be found at inter alia The Conflict Conversations blog.
2. An article dealing with some of the aspects discussed above (PDF) Chinese Conflict Management Styles and Negotiation BehavioursAn Empirical Test
3. Distinctive Chinese negotiation and conflict approaches as seen from a Western business perspective at Chinese Conflict Management Styles and Negotiation Behaviours - Zhenzhong Ma, 2007
4. Relevant articles for your general negotiation and conflict work, and their source material, can be found at www.conflict-conversations.co.za
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok
July 2025