Ah, but your land is beautiful. Cruel and beautiful.
Alan Paton
Apartheid has fallen, see, we die right next to each other now, in intimate proximity. It’s just the living part that we still have to work out.
Damon Galgut
This love, this love. My love for the yet to be born. My love for my people. This love so glorious. This love so precious. This love so conquering. Oh, this love so supreme.
Fred Khumalo
In everyone I pass I can see a little of myself. I carry a little of everyone I know in me.
K. Sello Duiker
Introduction
1. Afrikaans political and socioeconomic issues have been receiving an unusual amount of attention on the global and local stages in the last year or two. This, as we will see, has several current and long-term consequences for the group, and there are developments and decisions that should give the various Afrikaner leaders cause for concern.
2. Given the escalation of the conflict markers that we will assess, it is necessary to analyze these conflict developments from a purely technical perspective, in a narrative that is often beset and distracted by overly partisan and emotional rhetoric. Before we begin: what is an Afrikaner? A white, first language speaker? Do we include the 73% of coloured South Africans that speak Afrikaans as first language?
3. I am aware of these nuances and distinctions, and I am certainly not saying that they are unimportant, but I also do not want to get distracted in the many possible side-avenues of these debates. For our purposes, I suggest that in reading the article you will know who I am referring to, without the need for definitions in this particular discussion.
My own position
4. I imagine that it would be fair that I briefly set out my own personal position and focus, essentially for two main reasons. Firstly, and as we will discuss, the conflict has progressed to a stage where there is a fair amount of gatekeeping as to who is, and who is not, an Afrikaner. It may be argued that I do not have the background, or right, to talk about the issues at hand with any lived experience. I will give the reader some background facts on that, and then let them decide that question for themselves.
5. Secondly, it is my specific intention to analyse the conflict not from a personal perspective, but from as dispassionate a conflict studies point of view as I can. I hope to show that my own personal position and experiences are not obstacles in the way of such a fair analysis.
6. I do not identify as an Afrikaner. My dad grew up in an Afrikaans home, where Afrikaans was very much a matter of pride and principle. My paternal grandmother, at times, refused to speak English to anyone. This stemmed largely from that generation’s personal experience with literally being at war with the English.
7. My dad was, however, never much of a stickler for an Afrikaans only life, as we can see from the fact that he married my mom, an English woman from the then Pietermaritzburg. I cannot remember a single instance in my childhood where Afrikaans was preferred exclusively, or preferred as our home language. We got by, communicating as we wanted to, in whatever language we preferred. My own love of English, as language and its culture, was therefore an organic development. I prefer English because it is, for me, a more beautiful, a more expressive, language. The last Afrikaans novel I read was in 1984 at university, a compulsory read. My home language is English, my wife is English, one year my son nearly failed Afrikaans at school. Most of my family live in Australia and the US. My spoken Afrikaans is acceptable, I suppose, my written Afrikaans is atrocious. I could not write even an article like this in acceptable Afrikaans.
8. None of that flowed from seeing Afrikaans, or Afrikaners, as in any way deficient or someone or something to be avoided. As a child I had options, and without ever coming to a conscious decision, I made my choices.
9. But Afrikaans, and Afrikaners, are nevertheless an important, much valued part of my DNA, the building blocks of who I am. I generally love Afrikaners, and I believe that they have a tremendously important part to play in the rebuilding and shaping of the future South Africa that people of reason and goodwill want to see happen in our country. I want to live in a South Africa where Afrikaners can live in peace and harmony, safe and prosperous. Just as I believe about all groups and languages in our country.
10. The nationalist gene has certainly skipped me. I do not really see myself as a part of a particular cultural group. I love my country, but I do so as a citizen of the world, I do not feel a part of any particular race or nationalistic group. My identity, my values are mostly shaped by my faith as a Catholic, with its clearly defined social teachings and values, and then the various contributions and experiences I have had the benefit of, from various people, sources and events throughout my life.
11. So, maybe I do not feel the issues close to the Afrikaner heart the way that they do. Look at what I have to say here, and judge for yourself where I may be missing the point, or whether there may be something of value to consider. I write this not as an Afrikaner, but as someone who studies and works with conflict, at an advanced level, and it is from that perspective that my comments should be judged.
Afrikaner as identity marker
12. Elsewhere I have written extensively on the complex dynamics of identity conflicts (not the same as identity politics, please note). It is very noticeable that by far the greatest part of the various important Afrikaans issues of the day are debated and pursued, including by its most senior leaders, without a basic understanding of these crucial conflict dynamics. Without exception, all of the big current conflicts, including farm murders, BBEE and race laws discrimination, land claims and so, are all complex identity conflicts.
13. This has important consequences for these topics as far as their persuasive potential, sustainability and effectiveness are concerned. Without such knowledge and experience, the full potential inherent in such conflicts cannot be achieved, not through lobbying, litigation, marketing or coalitions. This is an important strategic oversight. Afrikaans as language, and being an Afrikaner, are very powerful identity markers. It is not just a language, culture or social grouping.
14. For so many Afrikaners that label comes with history, with pride, with a sense of belonging. Like all strong identity markers it creates a very strong in-group, where the mechanisms of in-group conflicts need advanced knowledge and skill to understand and steer correctly. If this is not present, we see a range of sub-optimal conflict outcomes, such a growing frustration and cynicism, cycles of powerlessness leading to increased in-group aggression, exclusion, feelings of isolation and existential threats, an increased acceptance of otherwise radical options, and a general reduction in conflict efficiency over time.
15. This is not the place to fully analyze the results of these decisions, but we will be briefly including this important aspect in our discussion.
A few conflict management observations on the Afrikaans conflicts of this moment
16. Being an Afrikaner was often, throughout its history, shaped by what its members were not, more so than what they are. The external enemy, real or imagined, has always played an important role in creating, steering and motivating that identity. This is nothing unique globally, and political leaders understand how these levers and pulleys operate. From leaving oppressive English rule, to hammering out their existence in the various pre-Union areas, the building of their national identity during the tough Union years, the Afrikaners leading role in apartheid South Africa, and then the arrival of democracy, have all flowed together in shaping a very particular, very proud, resilient identity. Reducing this process, and its results, to caricatures is as factually incorrect as it is dangerous to the enemies of Afrikaners.
17. It is unhelpful to generalize too much on what led to the current escalation of Afrikaner conflict, but for purposes of our conflict analysis we can do briefly so, based on a number of relatively common cause observations. Initial anxieties and fears around democracy settled into a general willingness to co-operate and co-exist. The nation’s general experience of a growing dysfunctionality of leadership, the spectrum of unresolved conflict hangovers from a rushed reconciliation process, and persistent economic and societal problems did not always track with the Afrikaner’s experience of these problems.
18. The narratives, causes, symptoms and solutions to these unacceptable, and seemingly intractable, national problems differed in important respects from those of most other national identity groupings. For many, the rainbow nation was shown to be an unrealized dream.
19. It has always been a marked characteristic of the Afrikaner history and psyche that they are self-sufficient. They have had to be. The principle behind the “Ons sal self” slogan, or the song, is not a recent development. The pressures placed on the Afrikaner in-group over the last thirty years, foremost of which has been the very predictable outcomes of cyclical, unresolved and worsening conflicts, then rather inevitably led to various Afrikaans political and other leaders forming the opinion that the government of the day would not be resolving their problems for them, and that they would have to do so themselves.
20. This is an instinctive reaction to protracted problems for the Afrikaner identity group. If we understand how identity conflicts work, we will understand that the objective truth of such founding assumptions about the existence and extent of the problems, the threats actually faced and the role of government in any resolution have very little traction in the creation and execution of these in-group narratives. Aims and strategies understandably, and gradually, changed based on perceptions, lived realities and the conflict options as were understood and disseminated at the time.
21. A predictable consequence of cyclical unresolved complex conflicts is a growing sense of distrust in conventional solutions. We see that manifesting in every single South African identity group. For some Afrikaners, as internal efforts failed and frustrations rose, this led to them seeking help from perceived allies.
22. Here the role of the US political and other leaders from past decades, coupled with the subtle but important overlaps in in-group identification, became a rational port of call for these leaders. Distrust, again real for the in-group, in local systems and processes made this inevitable, and the surprise expressed at this in some quarters is indefensible. Focused lobbying, on a range of matters, often cleverly and sometimes accurately presented as matters of joint interest, became an important tool in the Afrikaner arsenal. As recent events in South African politics have shown with great clarity, the concept of lobbying is not well-understood, universally accepted, and is generally distrusted, by large sections of South African society.
23. These differing goals and perceptions widened existing polarizations, and provided fuel to the fires of the devious and the unaware alike. These lobbying efforts had results that, most probably, exceeded the expectations of even its initial proponents. This the involved interest groups, such as Afriforum and Solidariteit, often get the blame for, often cast in aggressive and accusatory tones. I do not believe that this is justified in most instances. The attention and focus around events such as the Afrikaner “refugees”, the inaccurate definition and expression of issues such as farm murders, land rights, BBBEE and the mistreatment of minorities took on a toxic life of their own that is more often than not a function of the second Trump administration, designed to meet their own ideological and strategic goals, more than it is the result of the original lobbying projects. To an important extent, the fires initially lit by these advocates have started running out of their control. We can debate whether such events were reasonably foreseeable at the time, or not.
24. Initial perceived successes, among which I would count the public embarrassment of president Ramaphosa and his team in that infamous 2025 White House meeting, emboldened Afrikaner leaders to press the advantages that they thought they have achieved. They had powerful friends in the White House.
25. These initially positive results however had two very distinct conflict outcomes, neither of which will serve the Afrikaner’s best interests well in the long run. Firstly, since the early days of the second Trump administration, South Africa has been front and center of a generally bizarre range of attacks and threats from the US. The crowning glory of these exercises in absurdity, the repeated assertion that the South African government is guilty of genocide against Afrikaners, together with other similar fact-free accusations done in public, have understandably led to a linking of these results to the lobbying content, despite repeated denials and evidence to the contrary.
26. Causality can be argued ad nauseum, and none of this will change anything in the public harm done to the country in general, and the Afrikaner interests in particular, both locally and abroad. The predictable, and conflicting, in-group narratives have been triggered, and they now run without much further work needed. If you need any reminder or examples of how these identity conflict errors get weaponized, notice how those efforts get used in political rhetoric in the coming weeks leading up to the 2026 general local elections.
27. Secondly, the increased global and national focus again very predictably turned up the volume on the larger identity conflict that is always our national responsibility to deal with. Again we need a good understanding of identity conflicts, and how perceived threats and insults mobilize people, how in-group narratives beat objective facts, and how the particular identities were activated by these very public, often embarrassing events mentioned. The in-groups built around race and language experienced an escalation which it is hard to imagine any other, more national, Afrikaner strategy could have led to. This again will have a non-zero effect in the upcoming elections, again adverse to Afrikaner best interests.
28. The US allegations and global attention united several seemingly disparate in-groups, rewrote important sections of existing in-group narratives, and energized these groups against what remains seen as the result of Afrikaner efforts. These probably unintended conflict outcomes then caused a further enforced schism in existing Afrikaner ranks, not so much in creating new fissures, but in emphasizing and demanding attention to existing ones. Again, as before in its history, the Afrikaner in-group turned on itself.
The Afrikaans purity test, what it means, and why it should be avoided
29. One of the recent developments in the escalation of these disputes that is very noticeable is the increased prevalence of a so-called purity test, an identity conflict phenomenon that acts as a boundary maintenance tool, where group members are evaluated against strict criteria to prove conformity to a group’s perceived core identity markers, beliefs, values and behaviours.
30. The general benefits of that in-group (belonging, sense-making, social connection) and the sanction of non-adherence (ostracism, insults, various forms of targeting) then follows from membership and loyalty being granted or withheld. This however, when sustained, leads to purity spirals, a very common event in highly contentious identity conflicts, where levels of loyalty and belonging are escalated as pushback and public rhetoric increases.
31. We see this in the general and social media, with various public individuals being allowed or refused membership, with various public indications of gatekeeping, exclusion and as the term indicates, that continuous testing of one’s “purity” and adherence to what, in this case, the true Afrikaner is supposed to be, regardless of the incoherence of that ever being a monolithic concept to start off with.
32. People and organizations who see themselves as Afrikaners, or who seeks to define and distinguish various nuances of what the term should embrace, are publicly vilified, all very classic purity test material. This is often perceived as good developments by leaders of such groups. It should not be. The increased prevalence of these purity tests and spirals indicate an increase in threat perception, group insecurity and polarization. Unless those are your leadership goals, these levels of conflict development should be dialled back in very specific ways.
33. These symptoms may make leadership and guidance somewhat easier in the short term, but they are destructive of the group’s conflict abilities and interests in the longer term. It leads to fragmentation, spiralling of differences triggered by the smallest of perceived differences, adaptability comes under strain, existing or potential alliances are lost or placed at risk, and the amplified demonization has a terrible effect on bystanders and sympathizers in the reduction of empathy and shared interests. Purity tests often prolong conflicts, and steer them down ultimately unproductive avenues, and it becomes impossible or extremely damaging to reverse zero-sum thinking and toxic polarization once it has become entrenched and normalized.
34. It may therefore be interesting to refuse people like Max du Preez and Ruda Landman their membership as Afrikaners, but there are better ways of dealing with real and apparent differences than through these public purity tests. In the long run, they are indicative of serious structural risks and deterioration.
Analyzing the present state of the conflict
35. An identity group such as the Afrikaner must find its own place in the sun, and it will be patronizing to tell them what those interests are. Seen through a conflict management lens, however, there are red flags that their leaders should be concerned about. We have mentioned several of these above. We can focus on a few examples.
36. The two points that we mentioned earlier can serve as a logical place of departure. Cynicism in the current efficacy of the South African democratic process is a rational position to take. Several, if not most, South Africans, share this view. It is an inevitable result of generational unresolved conflicts. Seeking out external alliances in the process of defending, or advancing, one’s own interests, is also a natural and logical strategy. Receiving the attention of powerful people in the US administration must seem empowering, the big brother that will help where other processes have failed.
37. A calm reflection will however show that this particular alliance hinges on the Trump administration, a potentially fleeting anomaly in US history. Placing all of one’s proverbial eggs in that basket may have adverse consequences when a new administration takes over. Burning bridges at home while building alliances on such unstable foundations can never be a good long-term conflict strategy. We need only ask countries like Canada, Greenland or a variety of age-old European US allies what the value of loyalty in this new age of American realism is worth.
38. When that alliance collapses, for whatever reason, the Afrikaner’s interests and image may be in a much worse position, both globally and here in South Africa, than what it has been before. The last year has seen a steep local polarization of the headline issues such as farm murders, BBBEE application, race laws, minority discrimination and so on, and these hardening of attitudes are not long-term assets for the Afrikaner.
39. It must be born in mind, from a conflict efficiency perspective, that the very energizing issues such as BBBEE, land claims and so on have corresponding triggers and mobilizing effects in other South African identity groups, and continued escalation and polarization are terrible conflict strategies, none of which serve the Afrikaner interests in the long run.
40. To persuade people such as decision-makers and voting interest groups of important matters, across those identity barriers, take far more than resilience and facts. Persuasion, and the use of power, in complex identity conflicts, is a scalpel, while for years now we see leaders using hammers.
41. Their leaders have largely lost control of some these escalations, and the polarization and heightened identity conflict dynamics have created expectations that will be very difficult to effectively deliver on in the long run. Most importantly, they are not using the best strategies and conflict practices available to them, particularly in deploying the powerful dynamics of identity conflicts.
42. The escalation of these various conflicts, whether purposefully engineered or not, has reached an escalation pitch that cannot be sustained for long, and when that runs out of steam, the factors which we have discussed will bring home a bitter harvest if it is not effectively managed from here on.
43. While the categories and details of the various Afrikaner issues and complaints are generally well-founded, the execution of these issues as conflict strategies are less successful. The creation and exposing of “the other”, an external enemy in an existential conflict, is a tried and tested approach, but as case studies globally indicate, it is disastrous for long-term interests, especially in a group- or country context. This is so, even if there is an objective enemy.
44. This is high level, complex identity conflict, some of the best illustrative textbook, laboratory case studies available. If I was consulting in New York or Paris I would be studying the Afrikaans conflicts. It is predictable to an inspiring extent, if we know what to look out for, and yet, the same strategic mistakes are made, over and over. It is cyclical, and generational, by nature. It runs on old, revived themes important to the Afrikaner identity. The isolated Afrikaner against the world can be retained as in-group narrative, but it is a very outdated modern conflict strategy. It needs important modifications.
45. We do not need a crystal ball to see the red flags waving as a result of some of these recent decisions. Globally the Afrikaner has received attention which would have been best avoided. The image of the refugee, the victim, is not congruent with how they see themselves, and it is historically an unhelpful image to trade with. The genocide / refugee narrative is so absurd and unsustainable that any benefit arising from this unplanned development must be fleeting, at best. The positions created for the Afrikaner by the Trump administration will, in time, cause pushback globally and locally.
46. Afrikaners themselves have, as the escalating purity tests show, become increasingly polarized and even radicalized. Mobilization based on these triggers is notoriously short-term before fracturing, frustration and alienation sets in. A small minority group in the South African political landscape can hardly be justified in setting fire to its already small numbers.
47. And other South Africans are not neutral to these events. What may have originally been viewed as the harmless efforts of a minority group have now dragged the country front and centre in global embarrassment and forced defensiveness.
48. The ungratifying events of president Ramaphosa’s White House visit, our putative exclusion from the G20 group, constant public defamatory treatment relating to the absurd genocide and refugee claims, all have triggered the same identity conflict responses in other groups. These triggers and where they lead to with some predictability are clearly also not understood by the Afrikaner leaders. These events have managed to create a sense of cohesion and solidarity among various South African groups that no political campaign could have achieved, a very important long-term own goal against the Afrikaner team.
49. Global and national rhetoric, often enforced as a result of the US pronouncements, added to existing debates and perceptions around separate development, self-determination and secession, have all caused the Afrikaner to be perceived as someone who does not want to be here, as someone not quite South African. With or without merit, the Afrikaner is often viewed as someone who seems to not want to work locally for local solutions. This again must have adverse conflict consequences in the long run.
Suggestions from a friend
50. Can it be argued that the Afrikaner is in a better position strategically in these conflicts now than say 18 months or two years ago? If the answer is a surprising “yes”, do those considerations extend to long-term strategic positioning? If the answer is “no”, what is the strategy going forward?
51. I have no real criticism of the content of Afrikaner issues, with one or two exceptions. The harm, both short- and long term, lies in the way in which these conflicts are managed. The propagation of the lone victim against the world, the small group who just want to be treated fairly, the claimed uniqueness of suffering, the doubling down of aggressive in-group narratives and the constant application of outdated conflict strategies are not the Afrikaner’s best option.
52. Framing of conflicts and messaging are often awfully mismanaged, and then doubled down on. Burning the bridge you are standing on may conform to past strategies, may mobilize the in-group for now, but it will run out of steam soon.
54. My past work records that I am not an advocate of compromise as a conflict strategy, and I am not suggesting that the Afrikaner needs to do much of that. A modus vivendi can be carved out that works better for everyone, better than the current dysfunction and underperformance.
55. But creatively tackling the country’s problems, as it pertains to Afrikaners as a group, can and should look a lot different from the persecuted, vilified group as currently portrayed. The group that so effectively punches way above its weight division, the group that builds universities and economies should redefine its role and potential in what the country can achieve.
56. None of that needs to accept what the current government has become, or naively wait for that position to improve. The new future cannot be built with old tools, tools that have already showed themselves inadequate to what lies ahead.
57. Arguably the biggest strategic mistake that the modern Afrikaner group makes, and perpetuates, is the complete and utter ignorance around identity conflicts. Their stated and public strategies try to run, understandably, on fact and objective arguments. Ironically, those weapons have a very limited application and success rate in true identity conflicts.
58. In fact, as research and case studies (as well as experience) show, those types of arguments are not just ineffective, they entrench people in their previous positions, hardening hearts and minds, extending conflicts way beyond what is necessary. It is one of the very clearly established reasons why good governance and rational arguments, in themselves, are inadequate political conflict strategies. Strange, counterintuitive, but there it is.
59. This is not about compromise, or playing nice. It is about the use of power, about persuasion. Firm resolve, high conflict competence and ability combined with more constructive goals, methods and results, both on the global and local stages, will be a far better conflict strategy than the current us-against-the-country image. This is the case even if, for the sake of argument, we accept that the Afrikaner’s fight is an existential one, one with incompatible and intractable goals, values and interests. It is then especially a better strategy.
60. Practically speaking it will require a few short-term changes. Afrikaner leadership, however defined, should upgrade their conflict competencies. The world has moved on in many measurable respects as far as available conflict strategies are concerned. Even without changing a word of their current in-group narratives this is still the case, and they are fighting very modern wars with outdated weapons.
61. A far healthier place must be sought for the Afrikaner, both in local and international arenas. There is much work to be undone, it does not help to further entrench harmful stereotypes. Once their leaders have their new tools they should revisit some of the projects that they may have discarded.
62. With new skills, sit down with the president, sit down with Roelf Meyer, learn to negotiate with a new enthusiasm, new messaging and resolve. Keep the valuable current alliances, and aim them differently. Mistakes of the past need not limit the present or the future. Understand that none of this needs favours to be done, or good luck, you can achieve these goals without expecting cooperation from anyone. Bring the energy and dedication of the current lobbying projects to more long-term constructive projects. Create and take hold of value that is on the table, but which no one is talking about, simply because no one knows that they can talk about it. Use your resilience, your experience, your media skills to aim in different, new directions. Repair some bridges, repair some of the in-group current narratives that are going to harm you pretty soon. Reconsider and improve your alliances, local and overseas. Change brand Afrikaner to align with the most efficient ways to get there.
63. The Afrikaner has a storied, powerful history. It is however not really all that unique in the current national context, though. Others have suffered, overcome, rebuilt, others want a good life for themselves and their children. The politics and history of strong men and women, of resistance, of endurance, show us that these qualities need not be divisive. Even intractable conflicts have solutions, if we keep looking, keep working, if we know what the creative alternatives are. The world is changing, things that may have seemed impossible have become arguable, possible. A rainbow nation is not a requirement for efficiency in what you want for your in-group.
64. Most importantly, these improvements to the interests of Afrikaners can be achieved without necessarily giving up on any of its present goals. Leadership groups such as the Freedom Front +, Afriforum and Solidariteit have recorded their clear intention of staying, so the question is really one of what the best strategy going forward is for the Afrikaner.
65. That best interest, in my view, lies in the improvement of conflict competencies which will open possible solutions and benefits, and then a reinvention of the Afrikaner role in South Africa, not as a sulky, isolated defender against various attackers, but as a vibrant group that plays a leadership role in fixing our country, for all to benefit from, a powerful group that transcends other outdated and harmful ideologies, a group that you want on your side. It already plays that latter role, but it should be enhanced, it should be its main identifying characteristic, it should shape and guide its goals and conflict strategies.
66. How it creates and sells those goals must change. If it is accepted, as I think we must, that the Afrikaner’s best interests lie here, in South Africa, the question is how that is best achieved. The current trajectory cannot be the best solution.
Across a Table
Maybe it’s only been you and me forever,
sitting across from each other,
in a thousand different ways.
Iain S. Thomas
Summary of main sources, references and suggested reading
1. A few more specific conflict topics, including the Afriforum + lobbying efforts, discussed in my article at https://www.conflict-conversations.co.za/conversations/crossing-the-line-the-limits-of-lobbying-and-appropriate-action-against-afriforum-solidariteit 2. An analysis of the accusations of a South African genocide, and a few conflicts strategies in response thereto, discussed at https://www.conflict-conversations.co.za/conversations/cry-genocide-south-africa-s-responses-to-us-accusations-of-genocide
3. A chapter on reconciliation in South Africa, from my book Dangerous Magic: essays on conflict resolution in South Africa (courtesy of Paradigm Media) at https://www.conflict-conversations.co.za/conversations/book-excerpt-chapter-16-reconciliation-in-south-africa-is-there-a-place-for-reconciliation-in-south-africa
4. For articles dealing with conflict in general, see our blog index at Conflict Conversations
(Andre Vlok can be contacted at andre@conflict1.co.za for any further information.)
(c) Andre Vlok July 2026
* Author’s note on the use of artificial intelligence in writing this article I learned to draft, argue and write in the hard school of litigation. I enjoy and value the very human process of creating ideas, of testing my own knowledge and thoughts. It is a process that I need, for answering some of my professional and even personal questions, it is cathartic and inspiring. Other than the most basic research assistance I do not use any AI in the creation of my written work, this article included. It is a matter of pride, of preference, and of mental health. Whether that is a wise choice or not, I will leave to the reader to decide.